

# Marine Corps

JAN 1959

FORTY CENTS

# Gazette



# Marine Corps Gazette

JANUARY 1959


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## IN THIS ISSUE

AN ETHOS FOR THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER OF TODAY .....	Wing Commander John Gellner, RCAF (Ret)	8
WHAT IS THE MCA? .....	B Gen S. R. Shaw	15
THE GALVANIZED YANKEES .....	Maj Richard R. Mathison, USMCR	16
INNOCENTS ABROAD .....	Maj J. M. Jefferson, Jr.	20
PROFILE OF A DILEMMA .....	2d Lt Ronald H. Greathouse	24
DECORATIONS AND AWARDS .....		27
LET'S TRAIN BY TELEVISION .....	Capt Robert Lindsay, USMCR	28
HOW TO LASSO A JET .....		32
SURVIVAL THROUGH DISCIPLINE .....	MajGen H. L. Litzenberg	35
FOR TO DECEIVE .....	Maj Reginald Hargreaves	36
THE JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC WAR (DEFEAT) .....	Saburo Hayashi and Dr. Alvin D. Coox	44
MISSILES AGAINST ARMOR .....	Richard M. Ogorkiewicz	52



MESSAGE CENTER .....	2
IN BRIEF .....	34
BOOKS ON PARADE .....	50
OBSERVATION POST .....	56
PASSING IN REVIEW .....	60

**THIS MONTH'S COVER** . . . . . The Marines Land at Shanghai—  
15 January 1925. By MSgt John DeGrasse

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


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
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### Counterattack

... By accepting a few broad assumptions as to the number of bombers capable of getting through a defensive screen and of the supposed absolute power of long-range missiles, Capt B. H. Liddell Hart manages to paint a dreary picture of our ability to defend Western Europe and win a thermonuclear war. ("Basic Problems of European Defense," GAZETTE: Sept '58.)

Two basic factors destroy Capt Liddell Hart's premise: 1) Considered in the light of Western air defense and reaction capability, it can be shown that the Russian Long Range Air Force does not possess adequate strength, in terms of adequate high performance aircraft, related equipment and adequately trained and experienced crews to inflict a crippling blow on the US and its Allies; 2) Guided and ballistic missiles, either Russian or Western, do not possess the degree of accuracy, reliability and payload capacity, even in terms of nuclear explosive, necessary to exert a truly decisive influence.

Our single great weakness lies in the fact that we do not possess the means to exploit the success which our air forces are capable of winning. The build-up of our land forces in Europe to the level recommended by Capt Liddell Hart would be the first step in that direction. The second and crucial step is the maintenance of our land, sea and air regular and reserve forces at a level sufficient to make possible a counterattack into the vitals of the Soviet Empire.

The almost hysterical repetition of words like "mutual suicide," lunacy" and "hara-kiri" in reference to

the West's reliance on nuclear weapons strikes at the heart of our ability to defend ourselves—the spirit of determination and courage without which all else is useless. It is regrettable to find Capt Liddell Hart, one



of the fathers of modern armored warfare, sliding into despair and defeatism.

Capt W. V. Kennedy, Armor, NGUS  
3400 Hawthorne Dr.  
Camp Hill, Penna.

### Forward Leadership ...

... I wish to compliment the editors of the GAZETTE for the publication of 2 timely and related articles in the October issue. These were: "Loyal Competition—The Life-Essence of the American Military Policy" by George Fielding Eliot and "The Military Profession: Is Pay the Answer?" by Col Clifford B. Drake. It would be well for all personnel who have chosen a military career to integrate the ideas and thoughts presented into the actions

that are daily required to keep abreast of the changing times.

It is not enough merely to read the lines, then pass on and say, "This doesn't apply to me." We must take advantage of ideas presented in military periodicals to tie in underlying principles to the everyday tasks. Too often we are satisfied to let the job run itself. It is at this stage that *challenge* is lost and an assignment that could be made interesting does in actuality become a *job*. No matter what the task, there must be foresight and courage to make changes, yet temperance and serenity when initial success or opposition is met in the process.

Competition and incentives (less pay and allowances, etc.) are 2 primary factors that enabled the supply support mission of this organization to make the progress it has in the past year.

These articles brought back to mind an incident that occurred about 1950. A group of individuals were visiting the then Marine Corps Depot of Supplies, Philadelphia. Production was high and efficient based on the theory of competition and incentives. The group, on its tour, passed through the section where shirts were made. In observing the work of the employees, one individual casually mentioned to another that the job of button-hole making didn't look very important to him. This word spread faster than fire and it took nearly 2 months for production to regain the loss made by these few words.

In closing, I would like to state that competition, when beneficially controlled, coupled with the incentive and married with the satisfaction of a task well done will get an organization over many of its hurdles. The forward leadership of superiors and the development of strong followership of those junior, are a team that will make us first—be it on the field of battle or in the peacetime field of managing this big business the military represents.


LtCol R. J. Bolish

MWSG-37  
3d MAW, MCAS  
El Toro, Calif.

(Continued on page 4)

★  
The GAZETTE will pay \$5.00 for each letter published in Message Center  
★

# Bell Laboratories Develops Pocket-Sized Frequency Standard for Microwave Systems




Lawrence Koerner, who developed the portable frequency standard, demonstrates how the device can be plugged in at a radio relay station to supply a checking frequency. Battery-powered, the device maintains precision calibration for several months.

Microwave radio relay systems depend critically on the accuracy of their "carrier" frequencies. At scores of relay stations along a route, carrier frequency oscillators must be checked periodically against a signal from a precise standard.

In the past, the maintenance man has had to obtain his checking frequency by picking up a standard radio signal from a government station. This operation takes time—and requires elaborate equipment.

With a new *portable* frequency standard developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories engineers, the job is much simplified. To check an oscillator, the portable standard is plugged in, and a button is pressed. In seconds, it supplies a checking frequency accurate to one part in a million.

Until now, such precision in a frequency standard has been obtainable only in a laboratory. The new portable standard makes it available for routine use in the Bell System. First use of the standard will be to maintain frequency control in a new microwave system for telephone and TV, now under development at Bell Laboratories. Other potential uses include on-the-spot maintenance of closely spaced channels of commercial and military communication systems.



Inside the portable frequency standard. Four Laboratories-developed devices make it possible: (1) transistor, which converts the power from a battery to radio frequency oscillations; (2) voltage reference diode, which maintains constant voltage; (3) piezoelectric crystal unit of superlative stability; (4) thermistor, which corrects for temperature variations.



**BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM**

(Continued from page 2)

### Magazine Troubles

A problem encountered in our infantry family of weapons has been the faulty magazine. The percentage of stoppages and malfunctions caused by the magazine in magazine-fed weapons is surprising. A recent inspection of BAR magazines, during elimination of the squads in squad competition, showed the majority of the magazines were faulty due to the magazine being deeply indented by the BAR belt pocket snaps. When the BARman or his assistant hit the deck, the snaps centered over the center of the magazine caused a dent usually deep enough to stop the magazine follower from feeding the ammunition up into position. The BAR belt should be modified or replaced. A possible solution would be to extend the flap of the pocket so it could snap at the bottom of the pocket, and possibly using the type of a snap that is used to fasten the magazine to the pistol belt.

With the M-14 rifle joining us in the near future, and before adoption of a belt for those magazines, let's give this problem some serious consideration.

1st Sgt Anthony B. Kouma

2d Bn, 5th Marines  
1st Mar Div  
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

### Faith Restored

... Thanks for restoring my faith in our magazine, the GAZETTE. Just when I was about to completely disown the professional magazine of the Marines, along comes the best edition in many years. The October issue really re-sold me again.

I've grown very tired of some authors rewriting their history books in the GAZETTE and after 32 pages of a 64-page edition on Napoleon one time, I really gave up, but now...

"Loyal Competition" should be a must for all Marines. This is an article that all Marines can read and understand. This is the kind of civilian authors the GAZETTE could use more of.

"The Military Profession" by Col Drake is a rewarding article within itself. Every Marine will stop and think after reading this article and perhaps think of himself as a profes-

sional military man again. Instead of saying, "I'm a Marine," he might say, "I'm a professional Marine."

Maj McCloskey really hit the nail on the head concerning 13-man drill. He shares the views of 189,999 Marines. This drill would be fine for a Marine Band that works together all the time, but we have yet to see perfection attained, and we



did pay a visit to Parris Island and saw the new drill in "confusion."

I'll be an avid fan of the GAZETTE as long as we have issues like this October 1958 package. Let's keep it a Marine's magazine, by and for all Marines. I believe you'll have more Marine authors this way.

TSgt C. W. Ward, Jr.

Marine Recruiting Station  
215 E. New York St.  
Indianapolis, Ind.

### Supporting Junior NCOs

... I have just finished reading Sgt Dye's "Make 'em Professional and Ship 'em Over" (GAZETTE: Aug '58).

Sgt Dye mentioned in part that the Marine Corps should swing back to the policy that the junior NCOs are the backbone of the Corps and should be treated as such. He stated we should instill some of the interest in the future of the Corps in the junior NCO and consequently increase the re-enlistment rate. I, as a junior NCO, can see and realize some of the problems of the junior NCOs that perhaps Sgt Dye cannot see due to his unique position as a "senior" junior NCO. Much of the disinterest and low morale as far as

the junior NCOs are concerned is fostered by their immediate seniors, i.e. the Staff NCOs and company grade officers.

As a junior Cpl, I had to place a Pvt on report for disrespect to an NCO and direct disobedience of a lawful order in the presence of several other Pvs and Pfc's. The man had been reduced to the rank of Pvt just a few months before for a similar offense. When brought before the company executive officer, I was told I could either let the executive officer award the man 2 weeks "voluntary" restriction or take him before the Company Commander and he would probably receive the same punishment, plus taking up an hour of the CO's valuable time. I, as any NCO should, placed my trust in the executive officer and told him to handle it, thus reducing the CO's work load. The offender received only a warning, thus was shown a lack of support of the junior NCO's decisions by his superior and definitely undermining the discipline of the organization. The majority of the Pvs and Pfc's held the NCO in contempt and the rest of the junior NCOs took the attitude of "What the heck, if you can't have a man punished for doing wrong when you place him on report, why even try and enforce rules and regulations?" Obviously, the NCO's morale was lowered and their effectiveness to the command vastly reduced.

In closing, the junior NCOs need much improvement, but some of this needs to originate at the top of the rank structure and work downward. I think that each staff NCO and officer should "search his soul," so to speak, and see if he is doing his part to support the "backbone of the Marine Corps."

Sgt P. S. Murtha

USNMC  
Bainbridge, Md.

### ... And Chaos

... I certainly commend Maj McCloskey for his practical and forthright article, "The New Look in Drill" (GAZETTE: Oct '58) concerning a situation that is causing chaos throughout the Corps.

1st Lt W. R. Stendahl, Jr.

MB, Naval Retraining Command  
Norfolk, Va.

(Continued on page 6)



# **—and a Few Marines**

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### Semaphore Flags . . .

. . . In reference to LtCol Reber's article, "Strongback and Radio Relay" (GAZETTE: Sept '58). It is concurred that radio relay is here to stay and that it is the answer to many problems. However, I am inclined to believe that the Corps has "too damn much communications." A far cry from the old days of the semaphore flags, we are now burdening ourselves down with bulky, complex equipment that I do not feel is in keeping with a fast-moving unit.

There is nothing quite like having a personal telephone or radio circuit. But how many Marines utilizing these services know of the tremendous amount of equipment and manpower that goes into setting up and maintaining these nets? As the saying goes: "*Communications is a command function; command is exercised through communications; therefore, communications must always serve command.*" This we are doing with more success than ever before in the history of communications. In fulfilling this requirement we are, however, in the sense of the communication unit, getting bigger.

It is nothing nowadays to see a communication vehicle parking lot crowded with radio vans, trucks and jeeps, all with trailers. Along with this, the largest units at the headquarters level, are communication units. There is more equipment arriving all the time, and the larger portion of the equipment that will now be declared obsolete is kept for back up. The shocker to this problem is that this rolling stock does not come complete with drivers.

We are all cognizant of the personnel problem existing today, and though some units can survive with minimum personnel, the units with the mobile equipment are, at times, in a complete state of unreadiness. It is my opinion that a study be conducted to see if we cannot come up with a more compact, lightweight means of communications than we have now, rather than a continuation of the heavy burdens that are slowly leading us toward immovability.

MSgt W. A. Smith

Communications Chief  
H&HS, MWHG, 2d MAW  
MCAS, Cherry Point, N.C.

### Meaty Solution

. . . 65 words in the first sentence! What would Dr. Rudolph Flesch say to that! But I'm a Knocke man; not a Flesch adherent. After mastering the first paragraph . . . I mean first sentence . . . I couldn't stop reading. The problem is posed well by Maj Knocke; ("Security: Handmaiden to Success," GAZETTE: Oct '58); his solutions are meaty, the application of which will require indoctrination par excellence.

Maj Karl D. Morrison

2d Recon Bn, 2d Mar Div  
Camp Lejeune, N.C.

### Hip Hip . . .

. . . Three very big cheers for Maj Jones and his article, "How Much Safety Should Aviation Have" (GAZETTE: Oct '58). It has become the general feeling of Marine "fighter pilots" that the big emphasis on



safety is rapidly whittling away the "fighter" feeling. The jet pilot, already in a pretty small cockpit, is becoming even more hemmed-in by the safety regulations.

Safety (the proper degree of) is a must in aviation as we all certainly realize. However, as so often happens when human beings take steps to correct a certain situation, we have gone from one extreme to the other, instead of hitting and holding the wise and happy medium.

The time is now, to get the safety program back down to its proper proportion. Now that jet pilots are "regulated" into flying their F4Ds, FJs, F8Us, etc., as though they were

R4Q "Box Cars" or R5Ds — now is the time to swing back the other way a bit. Let's give the words "fighter pilot" true meaning again. While we're about it, we might even borrow a little "philosophy" from the RAF boys.

Capt D. J. Slee

MAG 13, 1st Mar Brig  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

### No Transfer Orders

. . . The editors recently asked for comments from Association members regarding the publishing of officers' transfer orders.

During the past 2 years the GAZETTE has made noteworthy progress in providing its readers with thought provoking articles of professional interest. We are less often being subjected to tearful articles lamenting the untimely demise of the Gatling gun or advocating the return of the high-top shoe as the only method of insuring the prestige of the non-commissioned man.

There are several publications which now list officers transfer orders. I read them with interest, as do most Marines. However, the GAZETTE is not the place for listings of marriages, births, transfers, or automobile bargains. Let's retain the GAZETTE as "... a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps."

Capt G. O. Goodson, Jr.

MCRDep  
Parris Island, S.C.

### Help Wanted


. . . The purpose of this letter is to ask your readers for historical matter (objects, directives, mementos, etc.) pertaining to the 1st Mar Regt. We are attempting to establish a museum of such material and certainly would appreciate any help which could be forthcoming from your readers. Persons having historical matter which they would like to contribute to the 1st Mar Regt's proposed museum are requested to forward such items to the Commanding Officer, 1st Marines, 1st Mar Div (Reinf), FMF, Camp Pendleton, Calif. My sincere thanks to you for your cooperation in this matter.

SgtMaj "J" "T" Langley

1st Marines, 1st Mar Div  
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

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**AN ETHOS FO**

By Wing Commander John Gellner, RCAF (Ret)

## DS FOR THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER OF TODAY

IN THE LAST 10 YEARS WE HAVE witnessed the end of a military era—of that of the “citizens’ armies” which opened during the American and French Revolutions and culminated in the 2 World Wars. In that period, the destructive power of the ever improving firearms made it necessary to employ huge numbers of men to fill the gaps torn by quick-firing rifles and cannon and, later, by machine guns; and, at the same time, made it possible to mobilize these multitudes behind comparatively light screens of regular troops. With the typical human capacity for making a virtue of necessity, the “citizen-soldier” was proclaimed the


mainstay of national security, while the importance of the professional was minimized. This, although military history clearly showed that regular troops remained invariably hugely superior to the civilians-turned-soldiers (after all, how could it have been otherwise?). This was demonstrated at the beginning of the period by the British in the Peninsula, and again and again through the years, in the Second World War, for instance, by the German Panzer units in France in 1940, by the Royal Air Force in the Battle of Britain, by the US Marines on Guadalcanal.

The “citizen-soldier,” however,

Group 1 Winner

---

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was necessary and, by and large, acquitted himself well considering his, on the average, limited training and lack of martial spirit. As the regular forces were usually decimated in the opening actions (in which they fought alone), and the remnants thereafter mainly employed in training the "new armies," it was the latter which determined the style of warfare. Generally speaking, the tactical art declined as the Forces became progressively more huge and less manageable, and as, in the course of a long war, the proportion of thoroughly trained troops grew less. The nadir was reached in the First World War, more lamentably so, it must be admitted, on the Allied side than on the German. The application of brute force was the leading idea, whether it came to the use of manpower or of materiel. The uninspired tactical theme was the drumfire followed by the "going over the top" of the long-suffering infantry, repeated again and again among forests of barbed wire, and in seas of mud and blood. C. S. Forester in *The General* likened it all to the antics of a crew of savages trying to extract a screw from a piece of wood. They pull with all their might, and when the screw does not budge they devise methods of bringing ever more force to bear, through using levers and fulcrums. It never occurs to them that the screw would come out easily if they would only rotate it.

A means of rotating the screw seemed to have been found when, toward the end of the Great War, the tank appeared on the battlefield. It meant the return of cavalry (in a new form) to warfare, and it brought the promise of a revival of the art of maneuver in land operations (the new-fangled air forces relied from the beginning on technique and sound tactics rather than on mass). Unfortunately, the concept of the "citizens' armies" was slow of dying; and the "savages," paradoxical as it may appear as they were professional soldiers and as such should have welcomed a change that promised to make an art again of the business of war, clung all too long to the crude, old methods. Liddell Hart preached to deaf ears in his homeland (but found ready followers in Germany). De Gaulle published



... application of brute force was the idea

his revolutionary *Toward a Professional Army* 6 years before the futility of the old system was demonstrated in the downfall of the vaunted French military machine in 1940. The ultimate Allied victory in the Second World War, gained again in the main because of a quantitative superiority which became irresistible by 1944, acted as a further brake upon the long-delayed process of discarding the outmoded idea of the "citizens' army." As Henry Kissinger so justly remarked in his *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, "Nothing stultifies military thought so much as a victorious war, for innovation then must run the gamut of inertia legitimized by success." So it was left to the Korean War to demonstrate to all who would see—even to the most tradition-bound in a militia officers' mess in Canada, even to the most ill-informed in the United States whose knowledge of warfare came from some of those ludicrously biased "GI novels" published since the last war—the utter futility of those long-drawn, costly and crude contests of mass against mass. It can be said that since the Korean War the type of warfare which is the unavoidable corollary of the use of "citizens' armies," if not the concept of "citizens' armies" itself, has been relegated to history, even in the minds of the public. It should by rights have been dead for almost 4 decades.

The days of the infantry replacement coming to the front line with 10 weeks basic training under the belt are thus, blessedly, gone forever.

The fighting man of today is typified by the member of a B-47 crew, with his well nigh encyclopaedic knowledge of everything connected with flying, and with thousands of flying hours and years of service to his credit. It can be taken as practically certain that only men of that kind, professionals all, will do any actual fighting in a future war—which, because of the complexity and decisiveness of modern weapons, will have to be waged with what will be readily available at its outbreak. In social terms this means that we are transported back some 200 years to the times when the defense of the community and the enforcement of its political objectives was entirely left to a comparatively small social group, the warrior class. The requirement for such a warrior class clearly exists today. Have we created one? Are we even on the way toward creating it?

Passing mention was made, above, of the "GI novels" of the Second World War. Together with a good many war films which have come out of Hollywood they present pretty faithfully the picture the average North American has of the professional military man. It certainly is not a favorable one: Against the unmilitary (this is considered a virtue), but brave, kindhearted and levelheaded civilian-turned-soldier stand the "regulars," almost as a rule petty, foul-mouthed as often as not brutal if they are NCOs, clanish, selfish, intellectually limited if they are officers. True, these stereotyped stories are written by non-

combatants who never had reason to be thankful for unwavering and competent leadership. True, there are also American novels and films which deal with the professional soldier with sympathy, even with admiration (as foreign, and in particular British, novels and films almost invariably do). The fact remains that on this Continent the attitude of the average civilian to the professional soldier springs from a combination of what Col Marshall in "The Military Function and the Soldier," (*Military Review*, July 1957) calls "extrasensitivity to the economic and social non-productivity of armies," and of the stubborn belief in the military effectiveness of the "citizen-soldier."

Regular officers have, since the First World War, themselves largely contributed to the building of the myth of the "citizen in uniform," many by not speaking up against it, some by paying lip service to it. Yet the term itself should have made them protest, for it implies that being a soldier is just another job different only in that a distinct garb is worn in its performance. The term thus excludes the *special motivation required* for the profession of arms, the *special way of life* implicit in the profession. The words, "citizen in uniform" certainly horrify thoughtful soldiers in other countries. Thus the story goes that when the new Austrian Army was formed 3 years ago, Western ideas on the subject of the "citizen in uniform" were explained to a just re-activated, very senior officer. "Good Heavens," the great man exclaimed, "what on earth are you talking about? To me, conductors of tramcars and collectors of gas bills are citizens in uniform, but never soldiers." In fact, it is just as nonsensical to call a soldier a "citizen in a uniform" as it would be to call a clergyman a "citizen in a cassock." Yet the concept was accepted and military life was gradually tailored to it. Nor was the contribution to national security of the "citizen-soldier" put into anything like the right perspective. The hugely unfair to the fighting man proposition that the worker in the armament factory, "the man behind the man behind the gun," was doing as important a job for his country as the soldier under enemy fire, was

only the ultimate projection of the theory that it really does not matter who does what in a war, provided only he contributes something. Told again and again that in a bomber crew the gunner was as important (presumably in terms of contribution to the accomplishment of the mission) as the aircraft captain, in an infantry outfit the rifleman is as important as the company commander, the average civilian was led to the conclusion that regular soldiers were not really necessary. Why spend money on them in peacetime if, once war came, the "citizen-soldiers" would come in anyway and do as good a job as the professionals?

The low valuation put on the military profession by the general public was bound to have an adverse psychological effect on the members of the profession. Their attitude toward an indifferent, if not hostile, environment became shame-faced, diffident, defensive. An exaggerated caution nurtured by frequent injunctions to avoid anything that might offend "the taxpayer," became a characteristic of the class. The constantly voiced fear, real or merely exhibited in order to keep the soldiery in their places, that the military might forget that they were under civilian control, and, coupled with that, exaggerated sensitiveness to any public pronouncements made by professional soldiers, even further repressed minds already laboring under the burdens of social rejection and of feelings of inadequacy. Yet that same society which in the heydays of the "citizens' armies" degraded the professional military man to something akin to the useless, but often irritating, appendix in the human body, expected him to be bold, decisive, masterful in the moment of need—by some miraculous metamorphosis the ugly duck-

ling was suddenly to soar, an eagle. Philip Wylie, a writer who otherwise in his *Generation of Vipers* shows little sympathy for the military profession, commented thus on this strange inconsistency in the attitude of American society toward its professional soldiers: "We only recently reviled our generals and our admirals. . . . We printed pictures of a doughboy and, underneath, the caption: 'Hello, sucker' . . . We despised war and we broke our weapons. Now, suddenly, we are bidding our soldiers to save us, for the love of God, quickly, and with little sacrifice. . . ."

In sum then, the era of "citizens' armies" and the myth of the "citizen-soldier" left as their legacy professional military men affected to a greater or lesser degree by some of the following undesirable group characteristics: lack of self-confidence; uncertainty as to their position in the community; lack of moral courage, of decisiveness, and drive; meekness; avoidance of responsibility; lack of motivation, and thus of dedication to their calling. That quite a few exceptions existed (Gen MacArthur is a striking instance) does not change the fact that these deficiencies were prevalent among professional military men in North America (and to varying, but generally lesser, degrees in all Western democracies) between the 2 great wars, and that they are still with us, albeit generally in forms no longer as crass as 20 years ago. The basic evil is that the profession of arms has lost its "ethos"—its inner meaning, its complex of moral values, and its code—in the era of the "citizens' armies," and it can be as little without its ethos (and acquire the right members, motivate them and develop them professionally and morally) as the priesthood and the ministry,



**Wing Commander Gellner, RCAF (Ret)** was born in Trieste of Czech parents (his father was a medical officer in the Czechoslovak Army). He received his doctor's degree in law at the University of Brno. After the German occupation in 1939, he escaped to the US and in 1940 enlisted in the RCAF. A well known author, lecturer and former instructor at the RCAF Staff College, he now resides in Toronto, Canada.



*Men who will stand apart from the mass of the community*

the medical and the teaching professions could prevail without theirs.

The comparison of the military with some of what are commonly called the learned professions is by no means far-fetched. Space does not permit to do more than to state categorically the main qualities and qualifications required in a modern professional soldier, but looking at the commissioned officer only (and it must be borne in mind that in modern war what is required of the officer is, with some variations and limitations, as a rule also required of the enlisted man) we find that he should measure up to the following specifications: He should be highly intelligent and studious; learned in his profession and singlemindedly devoted to it; of balanced temper, dignified, just, honest; imbued with the true sense of discipline; self-

denying, physically brave; possessed of the moral courage that will allow him to make fateful decisions without wavering. This is undoubtedly a tall order, but by no means an unrealistic one. In fact, officers of that type will have to be produced in great numbers (and the entire system of military education will have to be directed toward producing them) simply because nothing less will do in the nuclear age.

It becomes immediately apparent that average men are not wanted as professional officers, but rather men of uncommon intellectual capabilities and, above all, of extraordinarily strong moral fibre. Such men will necessarily stand apart from the mass of the community. This separateness leading at times to isolation has always been recognized as a requirement of military leadership,

from the "guards" in Plato's "Politeia," through the knights of the Middle Ages, to the captain of the warship taking his meals alone in his cabin. Nor has the modern process of levelling off of society—we call it falsely "democratization"—weakened the validity of the rule that leadership demands a modicum of separateness from those led, guardianship some separation from those protected. For it is still so that the same people who are the loudest in claiming that "they are as good as the next fellow," look out in an emergency for a leader who is not merely as good as they are. And to call on a witness, T. E. Lawrence ("Lawrence of Arabia"), who voluntarily underwent the unusual experience of becoming an enlisted man after having been for years a senior officer holding practically independent command, fully agrees in *The Mint* with the preference of his fellow RAF recruits for "officers so different that they'd not challenge our comparison anywhere."

The separateness of the officers' class, and in general of the professional military class, from the broader community is important also for purely practical reasons. As the military profession requires extraordinarily capable men, yet necessarily must offer comparatively paltry material rewards and, at any event, should lead its members toward frugality, to "hard living"), it is essential that the milieu in which professional military men live should as it were be "de-materialized." In this milieu ethical values should be made to replace material just as they do in the lives of other learned and capable men (and their families) with comparatively small incomes, such as clergymen and university professors. Here again separateness is a very great help—and often an indispensable condition of well-being and happiness. It may be mentioned in passing that this device (deliberate separation in order to preserve a set of values different from that of the community) is traditional in the military profession. It was carried to the extreme in the early Middle Ages with its semi-monastic orders of knights (who did much of the fighting in the Crusades, and probably saved Europe in the Moorish Wars). It was still generally ac-

cepted in the Nineteenth Century, in Europe as well as in America—R. E. Lee considered it the most important quality of an officer "to be able to deny himself," and regular soldiers lived accordingly, in proud and spartan segregation. It is still the rule in some European countries with unbroken military traditions.


The formation of an officers', as part of a professional military, class is also highly desirable in order to emphasize the special qualifications necessary for joining it, and the distinct way of life which must be adopted by those who join it. For some reason, "elite" and "belonging to an elite" are ugly words in our vocabulary, but the fact remains that in this day and age the professional soldiers must constitute an elite; must know that they belong to an elite; and must persuade (by their performance, not by propaganda) the public that the military establishment is an indispensable and outstanding (elite) component of society. Prestige, and even more important, the knowledge that what is being done is worth while and done superlatively well, are so generally recognized as powerful foundations of morale (and, incidentally, as satisfactory substitutes for material rewards) that it seems superfluous to belabour the point any further. An example may, however, serve as illustration: In Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police is neither better nor worse paid than other branches of the federal service, but because of the rank structure the individual RCMP officer is as a rule not as well off as a man with equivalent qualifications in, say, the armed services. Yet competition is fierce every year for the few openings available for entry into the RCMP, and the corps is in the enviable position of being able to pick and choose the best. The attraction is the prospect of belonging to an organization which knows that it is an elite, and which is generally recognized as such. Incidentally, the RCMP also has its own peculiar ethos, carefully preserved and nurtured, and translated into a rigidly adhered to code of behavior.

It is characteristic of the still prevailing mood of suspicion toward, and impatience with, the professional armed forces which has been left

as a legacy of the era of "citizens' armies" that trends toward exclusiveness are readily accepted in the community (e.g. social clubs, the Masons), but any attempt at keeping apart if it comes from the military is invariably decried as "caste spirit" and "clannishness." It will undoubtedly take some considerable time to persuade the public that while the professional armed forces must be organically integrated into the democratic state and the professional soldiers must be wholeheartedly devoted to the state and the constitution, to insist on an identity of values in the Forces and in the community would be most undesirable. Indeed, such an identity of values could well disqualify (or at least substantially lower the usefulness of) the professional soldiers as effective sole protectors of the community.

The realization that he alone in the community (the nation) is capable of protecting it against foreign aggression and of enforcing its just international objectives, must be the starting point in the building of an ethos for the modern professional

soldier. This unique position, of sword of the nation, implies privileges and duties which before the coming of the era of "citizens' armies" gave to the soldier his leading position in society. To discharge his responsibility the soldier needs a special kind of discipline—the French speak of a fervor or passion for discipline—that will enable him to subordinate at all times, readily, his bodily comfort, his likes and dislikes, his mental peace, and ultimately his whole self, to the stern demands of his calling. The "areté" of the Greeks, the "virtus" of the Romans, embody the basic components of that discipline which in turn is the foundation of the soldier's dedication to his task. They have been stated in different ways, but they all come back to Plato's 4 great manly virtues: wisdom, courage (physical and moral), moderation (in day-to-day life as in judgment), justice. The soldier must be so imbued with the "areté" that all his thinking and all his actions are directed by it. His code of behavior is the outward manifestation of the "areté" by which he lives.



*The professional soldier must constitute an elite*



*Discipline based on trained judgment and power of decision*

This, in brief, is the traditional concept of the soldierly ethos. It will be seen that its main characteristics are a clearly defined set of moral values and the demand for strictest observance. In modern times these characteristics have been conspicuously present in the code of the German, and in the "bushido" of the Japanese officers corps. Frenzied propaganda aimed at the Prussian "junkers" and the Japanese "warlords" has made them appear as ugly caricatures—it should not have made us forget that they were also excellent officers, supremely patriotic, brave, ready to bring any sacrifice. Whether we like it or not, the professional soldier in the nuclear age will have to be tailored to that pattern—and it must be realized that to "humanize" it too much would militate against the requirement for rigidity in the soldier's ethos.

In this connection, the term "discipline" requires explanation. The time-honored definition of discipline as "the prompt and cheerful execution of orders" has really not served any more for a long time, and is obviously wholly inadequate today,

both theoretically to define discipline in its function as the core of the soldier's ethos, and practically to describe the type of discipline demanded by conditions of modern warfare. For in modern war there is a need for a discipline more automatic than ever before, that is, for "drills" in the sense of predetermined actions to be taken automatically, without reflection, because there is no time to think, and for a more flexible discipline than was ever considered tolerable, based on trained judgment and power of decision exercised even at a low level of responsibility. In either case the criterion must be what is right in accordance with a clearly understood and unquestioningly accepted code of behavior. Modern discipline should thus be described as "a state of mind, brought on by training and by motivation, which makes one do promptly and effectively that which in any given situation is in the national interest. Here again, and with particular force, the importance of the soldier's ethos as the sure guide of his actions becomes apparent.

At first sight it would seem that

little would be needed to revive the ethos which motivated and inspired the professional soldiers before their temporary eclipse in the era of the "citizens' armies." After all, the code of the military academies in the United States, and of the service colleges in Canada, comes close to translating into practical life the ancient ideal of the "areté." Unfortunately, the military academies and colleges are not an introduction into military life, but only an episode at its beginning. The academy code is watered down almost as soon as the cadet is commissioned, to be practically effaced later in the milieu of married officers' quarters. The officially stated aim to make the situation of the professional soldier equal, in emoluments as in amenities, to that of civilians of commensurate qualifications, tends to speed up the process, as does the influx of officers directly from the public schools system and the dilution of the services with hosts of often wholly unmilitary specialists. Under the circumstances, we are still producing in our professional military men that anachronism, the "citizen-soldier." We are thus perpetuating the ills of a past era, to the gratification perhaps of parts of the public, but to the definite detriment of the country. What is needed is a soldier class, distinct in mental outlook and in mode of living, dedicated, austere, indifferent to material rewards, deriving its satisfaction from the sure knowledge that it is an elite group on which the safety and prosperity of the homeland entirely depend. To try and create such a warrior class would not be a futile groping for times long past and values long lost, but a level headed and timely attempt to produce the human material required for the accomplishment of the military tasks in the nuclear age.

USMC



### *Hold 'em and Squeeze 'em*

☛ WHILE FIRING THE RANGE with the post rifle team some years back we had a rather loud range NCO who was forever on the bull horn yelling at the team members. His favorite was: "If you don't hold 'em and squeeze 'em, you won't be able to cover the group with a poncho."

In our last week of firing, prior to leaving for the Marine Corps matches, he was getting in everyone's hair. Even the butt detail could hear him loud and clear. After yelling at the first couple of relays, a shooter shot a possible at the 300-yard line. The target came up draped with a poncho and a loud voice called, "See if you can get them tighter than that, you bull-horned . . ."

MSgt B. M. Rosoff

Marine Corps Gazette • January 1959

# WHAT IS THE MCA?

By BGen S. R. Shaw



I know to many of you, the Marine Corps Association means primarily the GAZETTE. It is true that the GAZETTE is an important part of the Association business. But it is by no means the reason for existence of the Association, nor is the GAZETTE the *most* important feature of the Marine Corps Association.

The most important single feature of the Association, and its real meaning to Marines is that it is the professional organization of the Marine. Perhaps here, I should digress a little bit and discuss the meaning of the word "professional" as it applies to the military in general and Marine in particular.

To many people the word "professional" when applied to military career people means professional in the sense of a professional baseball player, football player, or boxer. They may mean it in the sense of skill—skill more than that shown by the amateur. But what that sense of the word really means is that you are hired to do whatever the game may be, for pay. The real difference between the professional and the amateur in that sense is simply a matter of money. One does for money what another does for fun. The distinction has been applied for centuries in other amusements than athletics.

I think you can see what I am driving at. The Marine as a member of the profession can hardly be said to be in the business for money alone. The only real tie to the Cleveland Browns, or the New York

Yankees is the matter of expert quality—skill. Certainly none of us like to think of ourselves as professional killers, the hired gunman.

The real meaning of the word is in the meaning that applies to the other professions—the doctor, the lawyer, the minister, the teacher, and if you recognize the Fourth Estate, the journalist.

It is the professionalism of the military officer, and particularly in our Corps, of the Senior NCOs, that distinguishes the military today from the warriors and men-at-arms of previous ages. This quality of the professional has 3 characteristics; those of skill, of responsibility to society, and of a corporate or organizational nature.

These characteristics may not exist in a pure form—in fact are not of the same degree or nature in each of the professions—and they certainly do exist in the military. Take the matter of skill. The professional man is a recognized expert in his field. He gets to be expert by a considerable amount of training and deliberate education in his field. This professional skill is more than the mastery of a craft. It is intellectual in nature, requires some knowledge of the history, the development, of the professional knowledge in his field. And advancement to varying degrees of eminence require periods of additional education and practice. Institutions of research and education are maintained for the improvement of professional knowledge and skill.

All of these things are true for the military man. As in other professions there are different areas of specialization in the broad field—in our case it is the particularly complex specialty of the Marine.

The second characteristic—of responsibility to society. This is the characteristic that the professional man recognizes that he has a duty to society above and beyond that which is recognized in his remuneration—in his pay. I need not dwell on that here. You don't join the Marines to get rich.

The third characteristic is that of the corporate character. By this I mean that there is a sense of organic unity—a consciousness of the professional group as a group apart from laymen. Even more than in the other professions does this corporate nature apply to Marines. Much of this characteristic comes from the lengthy discipline and training to achieve competence, the sharing of a common bond of duty—for we in the Marine Corps, the sharing of a life apart from the ordinary layman is the normal way of living.

In other professions this characteristic leads to the establishment of professional associations. In some, membership in the association has become a necessary fact for public acceptance of competence to practice the profession. The associations exist for fostering of improved professional competence, to assist in the exchange of professional knowledge, and to set and maintain high standards for the members of the professions. On occasion, they have had to engage in campaigns of defense against those who, in one way or another would do injury to the profession or its members.

All of these things the Marine Corps Association includes in its purposes.

Now I can boil all of what I have said down to a few words. To you as Marines, the Marine Corps Association is your professional association. Your membership in that association indicates that you recognize your membership in a proud and honorable profession, that you wish to participate as an individual in the preservation and advancement of the profession, and that you wish to associate yourself with others of similar intentions.

USMC

# THE GALVANIZED YANKEES

By Maj Richard R. Mathison, USMCR



NO OFFICER IN OUR NATION'S HISTORY faced a more difficult command decision than Commodore T. T. Craven of the US Navy. His choice was between violating the sworn word of his country or facing personal dishonor. That grey morning in March of 1865 when his ship, the *Niagara*, stood off the coast of Spain he made his choice — and was tried by court-martial for it.

No man can truly recreate the subtle circumstances of history. But we can try to put ourselves beside the Commodore as he stood silently at his command post, his telescope trained on the black Confederate ironclad ram, the *Stonewall*, lying low in the water off his port bow. On the starboard side was another hulking Union ship, the *Sacramento*, also under the Commodore's command. In the distance were the adobe-colored cliffs of the Spanish shore, hazy under the hot Mediterranean sun.

A simple problem in tactics you say? Attack! But, now the Commodore puts down his telescope and scratches his grey beard. Down on the deck 400 sailors stare sullenly back from behind the cannon and rigging. A moment before, these men had been jubilantly cheering the *Stonewall*. Now they stand sulky and silent.

If you order the attack you wonder what will be the outcome. For this is no simple problem of a mutinous, cowardly crew. These men have been given the sworn promise of the US government that they will not have to fight a Confederate ship.

So the questions shape themselves and weave into one another and into the final order that the Commodore must give. Should he violate the trust these men have put in him and his country and press the attack? Should he follow his sailing orders? If he does choose to fight will his crews stand back and let his ships be sunk? Does he have the right to commit these ships to battle knowing that they will almost certainly be lost because his crew will not fight? Viewed from the lofty perspective of nearly a century, it is simple to say he should fight to the death as his orders decree and his duty requires. Yet, such a decision might have been too easy.

But, before he decides, let us re-

view the circumstances which led to this tense moment.

The year is 1861 and, in the North, the country is in the first flush of wartime excitement. In the cities and villages the men flex their biceps and curse the Johnny Rebs who dare to question the word of the US.

Abraham Lincoln has called for 42,000 volunteers to fight the newly formed Confederacy and lines of men stand before the recruiting offices chewing "black twist" and waiting their turn to sign up. It will be a quick war and a bit of excitement away from the humdrum of the field and shop.


Within a few months, 208 regiments, numbering 225,000 men, have offered their services and been accepted. The War Department starts declining volunteers, knowing there is another half million ready to join when called upon.

Gen McClellan is drilling his green troops in preparation for his big offensive — the Peninsula Campaign. This will set the Johnny Rebs back on their heels and the war will end soon. By 1862 the Army is full and the arsenals loaded. So confident is the Union of its strength that the War Department issues General Order No. 33 on 3 May 1862, which suspends all enlistments of volunteers, and the Secretary of War orders all furniture in recruiting offices to be sold at public auction. The War is practically over.

Gen McClellan sets forth on his disastrous misadventure, the Peninsula Campaign. By the autumn of 1862 it is ended, and the Army of the United States has lost an immense number of men by discharge, desertion, sickness and death. But, still, the Union does not realize the true proportions of the War. It is but a matter of calling for new volunteers, officials reason and the Army will be built up again.

But the psychological moment has passed. The Union is already tired of the War. The War Department makes vigorous efforts to secure new soldiers but there is little response. Meanwhile the victorious Confederacy grows in strength.

The situation is desperate. While Union forces sit back with depleted ranks, and volunteer enlistments are at a standstill, the South has its ranks full and old organizations in-



**Maj Mathison** was commissioned in the Marine Corps in July of 1942 after attending George Washington University. During WWII he served with MAG-14 and MAG-42 as a ground officer. Following the war, he served with Reserve Squadron VMF-123, Los Alamitos, California. He has worked for the Associated Press and has been the Managing Editor of Fortnight Magazine, a California news magazine.

tact. One Northern editor describes this Southern strength as due to an enlistment law so drastic "that it robs the cradle and the grave" to furnish soldiers.

Far to the north of the battle lines another enemy of the Union hears of the difficulties of the War Department. Chiefs of the Sioux nation meet and discuss the War. Still dreaming of regaining their lost lands they see the distractions and worries of the Union generals as their big chance. They grab this opportune moment to go on the war-path.

They devastate a large area in Minnesota, burning farms, looting and killing. Union generals start shuffling their empty regiments trying, somehow, to meet this new menace and still hold a line against the Confederate tide.

It is at this desperate moment that someone thinks of an answer. Confederate prisoners of war have been assembled on Johnson's Island in Lake Erie and other points along the Great Lakes. Perhaps they will agree to fight the Sioux.

Union officers appeal to them for help. Enlist in the Union Army, they plead, and fight the common enemy of civilization, the Sioux. Again and again the Union officers explain that these prisoners will be given the promise of the US that they will not have to fight their brothers of the Confederacy.

Reluctantly, at first, a few prisoners agree. After all, the Indian is, indeed, the enemy of all. And fighting a red man has nothing to do with the War. Within a few months enough Confederate prisoners have volunteered to form several regiments under Union officers. They are given horses and Union uniforms and dubbed "The Galvanized Yanks." Like wash tubs, the Union soldiers joke, they have a coating of

the Union uniform but, underneath, they are pure Rebs.

The Galvanized Yanks ride out to meet the Sioux and restore order. The War Department continues to plead for more volunteers but little happens. So desperate are some states to meet their enlistment quotas with the War Department, that they send delegates to Washington to try to get the 2 regiments of Galvanized Yanks accredited to their quotas.

The Navy, also desperate for men, hears of the success of the Galvanized Yank experiment and arranges to ask for prisoner volunteers to man their ships. (Gideon Welles, then Secretary of the Navy, reported in his diary, which was published years later, that in the autumn of 1863 the Navy was so depleted that he had 30 or 40 ships laid up in Navy yards for lack of crews to man them.)

The Navy sends officers to the prisoner camps. They try to enlist enough men to man these empty ships. They keep repeating again and again the Union promise: no prisoner who enlists will have to fight his brothers and friends of the Confederacy. The ships will carry supplies and, perhaps, tangle with a few British blockade runners bringing supplies to the South.

Finally the Navy manages to sign up 400 prisoners under the written guarantee of the US that they will not be required to fight the Confederacy.

The Navy Department ships these 400 "Galvanized Yank" sailors to New York City. In New York harbor, a newly commissioned ship, the *Niagara*, its timbers glistening, is prepared for its maiden voyage. She is destined for foreign service with the usual complement of Union commissioned officers, warrant officers and petty officers. The Navy

Department selects Commodore T. T. Craven to command this new ship. He is a career naval officer with a fine, if not spectacular, career behind him. There is much joking and discussion of the *Niagara* before she puts to sea. Everyone knows she is destined for nothing but dull missions with little chance for excitement. Yet, Commodore Craven feels confident that—despite the odd crew—the *Niagara* will be a good ship.

So, just before dawn on 1 June 1864, the *Niagara* puts to sea from New York Harbor. She is under sealed orders but that is just a formality. Everyone knows her dull mission.

The *Niagara* is standing well off the Eastern seaboard before Commodore Craven opens those sealed orders. What curious decision had brought about those orders goes unrecorded. But they call for the *Niagara* to meet and capture Confederate cruisers. And, down on the decks, 400 loyal Confederate prisoners man the guns!

Commodore Craven must have pondered mightily those orders. Under ideal conditions, of course, he could live up to the promise of the government and still carry out his duty. The *Niagara* was a big ship, well armed, and it would be possible to capture Confederate cruisers without a shot being exchanged. Commodore Craven moved farther and still farther out to sea, looking for a prey he must have hoped he would not find.

He roamed the Atlantic for months and, by March of 1865, the *Niagara* was cutting the blue waters of the Mediterranean. Beside her—at that time—was the *Sacramento*, also under the command of Commodore Craven and also carrying a

complement of the Galvanized Yanks.

It was just after dawn that the lookout sighted the sleek outline of the Confederate ironclad. It must have surprised everyone to find the *Stonewall* so far from home. Rams were built for hot and heavy close battle, not for world cruising.



The moment of decision had come. Commodore Craven stood on the bridge and listened to his crew shout joyous greetings to the ship from their homeland. The jubilant Southerners probably thought some kind of a temporary truce could be arranged and there'd be a chance to talk with the *Stonewall's* crew.

The Commodore stood weighing all the intangibles. He was a brave man and a good officer. He was also

an honorable one. Should he follow his orders and commit his ship to battle? The temper of the crew was such that it would undoubtedly mean mutiny at the least. He knew that these men under him would not deny their birthright and turn against the Confederacy. And, despite his orders, he wondered if he had the right to send 2 valuable Union ships into almost certain destruction with crews that would not fight. And, there *was* the sworn promise of the United States. . . .

Commodore Craven ordered the *Niagara* and *Sacramento* to come about and ran for the open sea.


He was brought to trial in December of 1865. Adm Farragut was president of the court martial that convened to consider the fate of the Commodore who had been given the terrible decision. He was charged with neglect of duty in failing to fight the *Stonewall*.

During the trial the promise of the US was ignored. The Commodore was tried on the simple charge of neglect of duty—the word of his orders. He asserted formally that he felt the *Stonewall* was too formidable a vessel for him to encounter with wooden ships. What was left unsaid was that he had been given a crew which would not fight and could not honorably be ordered to fight.

The court martial board pondered the crisp facts and pointedly ignored the great intangibles. Commodore Craven was found "guilty of the charge in a less degree than charged." He was sentenced to suspension from the Navy for 2 years on leave pay.

And thus ended one of the oddest command problems any officer has ever been called upon to solve.

US MC



### General Orders

● EARLY IN 1942 AT PARRIS ISLAND all recruits were impressed with the importance of interior guard duty—the country was at war and wasn't it possible that the Germans might put a small party ashore from a submarine?

At 0300 one morning the OD approached a recruit sentry, who promptly brought his rifle and bayonet to port arms and shouted, "HALT!"

A long pause ensued and it occurred to the OD that the recruit had forgotten how to challenge properly.

"Lad, I am the OD. Haven't you forgotten something?"

Replied the recruit, "Yes sir, and you're going to STAND RIGHT THERE until I remember it!"

Maj Clyde B. Shropshire

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by Maj J. M. Jefferson, Jr.

IN ONE OF HIS INTRODUCTIONS, Col John W. Thomason, Jr. cites this sentence as the saying of Charles the Second: "... and hereafter, when we hear a strange thing, we will tell it to the Marines, for the Marines go everywhere and see everything, and if they say it is so, we will believe it!" It was never so meaningful, for Marines in this day are more traveled than ever before. Stationed in most of the principal countries of the world, the possibility of their employment anywhere on the face of the globe is all too apparent. In the course of one tour of duty—or perhaps two—a Marine can come into contact with most of the racial strains of the world, and find pressing need for the languages the peoples use to

communicate among themselves. It is a grievous fact that in the overwhelming number of cases this need cannot be met. If there is an exchange of ideas or information it is because sign language is adequate to the occasion, or because the Marine has met a man who knows English.

There is explanation for this, of course. But no amount of explanation can justify the sad lack of competent linguists in an otherwise highly sophisticated Corps. The paucity of those who know at least one other of the world's major languages, and have an understanding of the area and the peoples where those languages are used, is cause for reflection. It gives rise to the belief


that we have failed to recognize truly the extent to which some of our concepts are outmoded. These concepts are here examined against the background of our capabilities; from this it is concluded that some of our ideas are obsolete if not downright mistaken, and suggestions are offered which might serve to correct, over a period of time, some of the errors into which we have fallen.

No one denies the importance of languages, but it is customary to regard them as a province of intelligence only. G-2 is of course a prime user. In combat there is urgent need for interrogators, interpreters and persons who can translate captured documents. For some reason, the other equally important

operational uses for foreign languages, both in combat and out, are little understood or at least little attention is paid them.

More and more Marines are being assigned to combined staffs, for one thing. For another, the concept of limited war includes the thought that Marines might very well be fighting alongside troops indigenous to the geographical area where that war breaks out. These situations involve joint planning, liaison and day to day association. At the present time the overwhelming majority of communication is along a one-way street: the English language. Our Allies provide most all the interpreter and translator services, because we haven't the capability to deal with them in their own tongues. This is convenient, but it is disadvantageous; it means we haven't complete communication with our friends. It can also give rise to error and grave misunderstanding. Unless our commanders have members of their own staffs who are thoroughly conversant with the language, the customs and the traditions of our Allies as well as those of our enemies, we are conceding an area of importance, and one we can ill afford to surrender. There is no substitute for complete understanding between those in a cooperative venture. Nor should we forget how much the knowledge of the language and of the area can contribute to the effectiveness of any American abroad. "People-to-people" is an excellent idea; but its real worth cannot be realized unless we are willing to give as much as we expect in return, i.e. the ability to understand—not only in language, but in custom as well.

The foregoing points apply to every American, to every service. It is time now to apply them specifically to the Marine Corps, to ask the question: What billets do we have in



**Maj Jefferson** was commissioned in 1943 while a student at the US Navy Japanese Language School. During WWII he served with the 6th MarDiv and the 22d Marines. He accompanied the 4th Marines to Yokosuka, Japan at the end of WWII and later served at the Marine Barracks, Yokosuka. In Korea he served as S-3, 7th Marines and CO, DMZ Company. From 1954 to 1957 he was Assistant Military Attache, Tokyo, Japan. He is now a member, Policy Analysis Division, HQMC.

the Corps that require officers to know the language, and to understand the area in which they are assigned? There can be but one answer: every overseas assignment outside the FMF, and those within the FMF which require close contact with our Allies. What is more this goal is within our capabilities.

In the company grades there are billets overseas, in barracks, on staffs, and those of an intelligence nature. A few of these require that the incumbent know the language of the country to which he is assigned; it is axiomatic that in any of them the officer would be infinitely more efficient if he were thoroughly conversant with the language and the area.

In the field officer grades, knowledge of the language and area is not only more urgently needed, but is of infinitely greater use. And it must of a higher order. To adequately serve on a combined staff, to be naval attache or assistant, or to serve as a member of a Military Assistance Advisory Group, or as liaison officer to a foreign command, knowledge of the appropriate language is essential. Our officers in such assignments deal as a matter of daily business with the highest ranking foreign officials. For them to be effective, a smattering of the

language will not do; fluency is required. The sense of this is that an officer selected for such duty should be, by previous experience, thoroughly qualified. He should not have to be given a high pressure language course just prior to his assignment. He *can* be, of course, and often is, because the desirable alternative, a qualified area specialist, does not exist. The upshot of the system—if it deserves the title of system—is that after 2 or 3 years in the billet he may achieve some facility in the language, and probably gains a useful knowledge of the area. In other words, by the time he has completed his tour he may finally reach the degree of proficiency he should have taken to the assignment in the first place. And the great pity is that he will in all probability never be assigned to the same area again, on the premise that it would not be in accord with proper career development! Insofar as the individual is concerned, perhaps no issue should be taken with this state of things. But it is at least open to question whether the Marine Corps as a whole, and the Nation, is getting a fair shake. The billet should not be utilized to produce the man; it should be filled by an individual adequate to its requirements. On the job training is a method accepta-

ble to the requirements of crew-served weapons, say, but it is hardly applicable to a position as important as an assignment with a foreign command or accredited to its government. Nor should it ever be so regarded.

Here it might be worthwhile to examine some of the gradations of language skill as against the military requirements for them. The US Army has worked out a classification system that comprises 4 parts, in general as follows:

Class a) This class includes persons who are completely bi-lingual, expert in the language and customs of an area to the extent that they are by themselves capable of conducting negotiations with a foreign government or its representatives. It goes without saying that they are always useful, but the Marine Corps has no requirement to produce individuals of this high [language] capability.

Class b) In this category are those who have a broad understanding of an area and its peoples, and have a degree of proficiency in the language that permits them to engage easily in conversation at any level, yet is not quite adequate to technical discussion. Attaches and their assistants, members of combined staffs, and liaison officers have need of this degree of expertise. Also included are those who can supervise the work of indigenous translators and interpreters which a Marine Task Force might have need to employ—military police officers, etc.

Class c) This group includes those with some knowledge of the language of a given country, sufficient to enable exchange of uncomplicated ideas, and to permit liaison at a low level, but without necessity to handle nuances of expression or extensive appreciation of the foreign history or custom. This is the level of attainment desirable for all company grade officers stationed overseas.

Class d) This lowest level of language knowledge includes that which is barely sufficient to provide the basic needs of those on duty in a foreign country—obtaining directions, ordering food, etc., in other words, that which can be gained from assiduous application to language manuals, or the level of skill to which one stationed abroad, but without expert assistance, can attain.

Given recognition that language

skills are required by the Marine Corps, the problem arises, how to provide them, consistent with other demands upon training and availability? The thesis of this article is that it can be done, within certain limits. Further, it is urged that it should be done.

Language duty is rightly regarded as something less than the principal business of Marine Corps officer training, which is to provide officers thoroughly competent in the management of amphibious violence. But it must also be recognized that the officer corps can—indeed, to be completely efficient, it must—include certain areas of staff specialization, such as engineering, intelligence, operations, supply, etc., in addition to the command specialties.

Ideally, language being a matter of culture, the officer inductee would be thoroughly versed in a foreign language. However, circumstances and college language courses being what they are, if it is to have them the Marine Corps must train its linguists just as it does other specialists.

This brings up the question of requirements. The question in turn points up a need, for nowhere are Marine Corps requirements for persons with linguistic knowledge clearly established. It is true that each year some officers are sent to language schools, but this is indicative only that at some time in the past certain needs were recognized. What must have been originally a clear idea of needs and objectives has somewhere along the line become completely subordinated to administrative processes. What remains is only quotas. These quotas are dutifully filled. The schools employed give useful, basic training in the language they teach, but in too many cases the training is given to no purpose. Because the graduates were not trained with a specific billet in view, they often are not assigned at once to an area where they learn to use the language studied. Detail officers are hard working, and highly competent, but omniscience cannot be included among their virtues. Without language experience themselves, and having no clearly delineated policy guidance, it is logical for them to assume that filling the language school quotas each year establishes a pool of competent linguists which

can be called upon in future years. This is a gross and unfortunate misconception. Language skills are highly perishable things. Unless put to immediate and frequent use, they rapidly disappear. What is more, the language schools do not produce polished linguists. At best, they provide the basic tools of the trade; the cutting edge can be honed and kept sharp only through continuous practical application.

There are additional experience factors to be considered. An important one is that the capability of learning a new language well is almost exclusively the province of the young. The LtCol in his late thirties can do it, to be sure; but will circumstances let him? Modern techniques of language instruction can impart fluency to selected students in even the most difficult languages within a year's time, or just a little more. The key words, of course, are "selected students." They imply both aptitude and motivation. There must also be availability, which here means time to study, because the phrase "within a year's time, or just a little more," implies all and not just a part of that period. Is it reasonable to expect a LtCol—for that is the rank required in the most important billets here under consideration—to emerge expert from such academic rigors? A very few examples might be cited as exceptions, but the overwhelming majority prove the rule: only the young and unencumbered have the time and will devote it to language study.

The objective must be to provide field officers with a knowledge gained by previous experience, knowledge which will enable them to devote their time and energies to the job in a foreign country rather than in trying to learn the skills necessary to proper performance of the duty. Insofar as the Marine Corps is concerned, this means that initial language instruction should be confined to company grade officers. Their minds are more flexible; they are more easily motivated to embark upon such a project, and in general their personal affairs pose fewer obstacles to prolonged study.

Having once created a skill, it must not be permitted to lapse. Some sort of incentive must be provided so that, once trained, an officer will want to keep his language alive

during periods when its active employment is impossible or inconvenient. The system of extra pay which foreign military services employ cannot be adopted without Congressional sanction. However, if he knows he will be again required to use it, no further incentive will be required, and assignment policies which will return an officer to the area of his special knowledge at frequent intervals are quite feasible. Furthermore, they need not affect an officer's career development in an operational specialty.

Chapter 7 of the Marine Corps Manual includes the following diagram, which outlines the general plan on which all officer career patterns are to be based:

It will be noted that only 6 years of the 20 year career portrayed are devoted to FMF duty, and 3 to schools which propound the occupational specialties. Eleven years remain to be utilized in the non-FMF billets. It is the thesis of this article that proper assignment policies, forcefully administered, can so employ these years for a selected group of volunteers that there will be at all times available in the Marine Corps a group of officer linguists who are highly qualified in the principal languages of the world. It is a worthwhile objective, and relatively easy to achieve. This is what is needed:

1) Requirements must be established. An ad hoc committee, or some group already extant, should establish Marine Corps needs for linguists. From these can be determined the actual languages in which officers must be trained, and the billet structure to support those needs erected.

2) Selection of officers. Prospective linguists to fill the billets established must be volunteers. They should be of company grade, and of proven academic or language adaptability. No impediment to a protracted period of scholastic application should exist. Upon selection they should be given to understand that throughout their subsequent careers they can expect frequent assignment to the general geographic area in which they will specialize.

3) Assignment policies must be established. They must also be forcefully administered. Someone to monitor all linguists and language billets must be appointed. He will


insure that an officer who was trained in Spanish, for example, would have a succession of assignments to require his use of the language; i.e., barracks duty in the company grades, staff assignments as a Maj, and perhaps as Assistant Naval Attache when he is in the rank of LtCol. In the Pacific area, if the officer were a Japanese linguist he could expect tours at one of the barracks in Japan, staff assignments with the Navy or the Joint Command, Assistant Naval Attache, and so forth.

The monitor's responsibility would be a coin with two sides. He would make certain that officers trained as linguists are always assigned to language billets or to ones where the

language can be used; the reverse of the coin would insure that none but linguists occupy billets where the language is a requirement of effective performance.

To sum up, the Marine Corps has a definite requirement for linguistic skills, but those requirements should be precisely established. The skills it requires must be provided by the Marine Corps through its own personnel training and assignment programs. These objectives are reasonable, and within Marine Corps capabilities, provided due recognition is given to the basic experience factors herein outlined. USMC

An ad hoc committee has been convened at HQMC to look into all aspects of the language program, and to come up with recommendations. — Ed.



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THE UNDERLYING FEAR OF LIMITED nuclear war is that it may provide the flash point for another all-out struggle. In analyzing the subtle aspects of limited war, however, the use of nuclear weapons utilizes present Marine Corps tactical and technological skills to the fullest, and is as unlikely to cause a global war as what we now term conventional weapons.

To understand the possibility that limited war need not touch off a thermonuclear holocaust, we must first consider the often misunderstood meaning of limited war. Limited war is essentially a political maneuver, and is not fought to consider unconditional surrender. This type of war has no purely military solution, consequently it must end in negotiation — at the point where our political objectives have best been reached. Perhaps the most all-inclusive definition of limited war is provided by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger in his book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*: "A limited war is fought for specific political objectives, which by their very nature

# PROFILE OF A DILEMMA:

## LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR

By 2d Lt Ronald H. Greathouse

tend to establish a relationship between the force employed and the goal to be attained. It reflects an attempt to *affect* the opponent's will, not to *crush* it. To make the conditions imposed seem more attractive than continued resistance. To strive for specific goals, not for complete annihilation."

It is generally accepted that the United States and Russia deem the unlimited use of nuclear weapons unwise — not necessarily out of humanity, but out of an urge for self-preservation. Behind this shield of mutual deterrence the Soviets give every indication of continuing their strategy of limited objectives. "Under the mutual threat of massive destruction, it is more likely than ever that another Korea will develop," asserts a Marine general officer. "We dare not leave a hiatus in our operational capabilities between pious indignation over outrageous communist behavior and the delivery of thermonuclear weapons." Far from revolutionary, this strategem has been in successful operation since Peter the Great penned his last

will and testament in early 1700. The influence of this little known document on communist thinking can hardly be overestimated. The Russian czar outlined a plan for limited aggression by "keeping Russia in a continual state for war, to hold the soldier ever ready — to choose the most favourable means for attack, to follow up peace by war, and war by peace."

While it is dangerous to rule out the possibility of general war, it is equally foolish to disregard the probability of localized conflicts. Clausewitz theorized that limited wars are likely under two conditions: where political tensions or aims are small, and where the military means are such that the overthrow of the enemy is not possible, or can be approached only indirectly. Historically speaking, limited war has been the mean — total war the extreme.

Recent experiences — such as the delayed British and French intervention in Suez — emphasize the importance of aggressiveness and mobility in curbing inflammatory situ-

ations. "The basic principle of our national strategy must be mobility," says George Fielding Eliot. "Our best chance of deterring or defeating limited aggression is similarly to be found in the creation of forces and weapons systems which will be equally well suited to exploit our geographical advantages as well as to achieve our ends."

The inherent mobility of the new Marine division — armed with at least 4 kinds of helicopter transportable missiles and backed by supersonic Marine fighter aircraft carrying other missiles — gives us a basis for analyzing the role of nuclear weapons in limited war. This analysis cannot be based on experiences of the past 12 years. Since nuclear weapons were not used in Greece, Korea, or in recent Middle Eastern disputes, our only conclusion would be that they have no place in limited war.

Opponents of limited nuclear war have posted several well-grounded objections. They point out that each side will attempt to outguess his adversary by using the largest

practicable weapon. Even if limited nuclear war is initially fought on a "low-yield" basis, will not the losing side be tempted to regain the initiative by resorting to more and larger mass destructive weapons? Further, won't the technical and destructive complications arising from their use impose a greater drain on our manpower and resources than ever before? Anyone even remotely familiar with the explosive capabilities of nuclear weapons could not fail to take note of these possibilities.

The primary problem of nuclear war—as far as the United States is concerned—arises in actions against nuclear powers, or against nations with vast resources of manpower which are difficult to overcome with conventional weapons. Certainly, the indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons against a minor power, or in a situation where we do not wish to antagonize the civilian population, may be unwise and unnecessary from both a psychological and political standpoint. Only the amount of force needed to win the objective need be applied.

Assuming that both sides wish to avoid all-out war—a requisite for any type of limited war—there exist some intricate restrictions which form the basis for keeping limited war limited. High-yield nuclear weapons cannot be detonated near friendly troops, on terrain soon to be occupied by friendly troops, or against friendly civilian bystanders. With these limitations in mind, there is little basis to assume that so-called conventional high explosives—now 10 times as powerful as in WWII—would produce any less devastation than limited nuclear war. Fortunately, in the development of nuclear weapons, we have not lost sight of this important point. Today we not only have larger strategic weapons, but smaller tactical ones—a fraction of a kiloton—as well. The immediate problem of radiation is already being solved. "It is possible for a bomb to be so clean that you can drop it and all the damage will stay within a 5-mile perimeter, and there is no fall-out whatever," states Dr. Willard F. Libby, member of the Atomic Energy Commission.

With the advent of the Marine Corps' dispersed unit concept, nu-

clear war need not be as destructive as traditional war. High casualty estimates are based on the assumption that most targets will continue to be those of past conventional wars, such as cities and populous industrial areas. Highly mobile, self-sustaining battalions remove the former significance of these targets.



In Korea, for example, certain restrictions were observed. The Americans did not bomb airfields and supply points in Manchuria, while the Chinese did not bomb similar targets in nearby Japan. An opponent who is prepared to ignite an all-out war, in preference to a limited defeat, would hardly be more restrained from using nuclear weapons in a war that began as conventional. The contention that neither side will accept defeat is a denial of the very principles of limited war. Inherent limitations in war are, for all practical purposes, independent of the type of weapons used. If they can be enforced in a limited situation such as Korea, they may apply to nuclear war as well. Such restraint in the future is not unreasonable, or without precedent. The entire history of war is one continuous precedent of restraint. Without it civilization would have been destroyed long ago.

The nucleus of Soviet tactical doctrine is massed manpower. But the

value of this manpower is limited by the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons, as well as the principles of Marxist dialectic materialism. If we utilize nuclear weapons, there is a limit to the number of troops that can be profitably employed against us.

Thus, nuclear weapons make use of the mobility and striking power of the Marine Corps as a means of combating limited aggression on our own terms—and shifting the risk of initiating all-out war to our foe. Because the psychological advantage of this type of war shifts against the winning side, the importance of diplomatic overtures which make it clear that a settlement is possible on reasonable terms, is evident. Any attempt to pulverize the enemy nation as a whole would tip the psychological balance that makes it desirable for both forces to keep the war limited.

Limited wars require units with high mobility and considerable firepower which can move to trouble spots quickly and bring their power to bear with accuracy and discrimination. These units must be capable of imposing a price for limited aggression that does not exceed the cost to us, or the force appropriate to the objective involved. Because of their greater effectiveness, nuclear weapons will eventually find a place in limited war. "If we get into a limited war, outnumbered to the extent we are in bodies, we have very little opportunity to win this kind of war unless we have one of two things: either the clear resolution to use the big stuff if need be, or have the technical weapons which neutralize the ability of the other side to put up more bodies against you." So said Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy.

The implications are clear: If the United States is to maintain its superior stature among the world powers, it must aggressively pursue its political objectives. In a changing world, with changing military technology, our leaders are faced with the decision to risk all-out war—or consent to camouflaged aggression. This is the dilemma of the nuclear age. Upon the decision will depend—not only our future—but the atmosphere in which the free world will exist.

USMC

# Decorations and Awards



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TSGT EARL J. LEHRMAN

VMR—253, MWSG—17, 1st MAW  
Iwakuni, Japan, 27 Apr 1958

\* \* \*

PFC ROBERT T. DOLLAR, JR.

H&MS—20  
27 Feb 1958

\* \* \*

## LETTER OF COMMENDATION With Metal Pendant

COL HAMILTON LAWRENCE

2d Prov Mar For  
Lebanon, 15 July—29 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

LTCOL JOHN H. BRICKLEY

1st Bn, 8th Marines  
Lebanon, 18 July—16 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

LTCOL CARL E. FULTON

2d Prov Mar For  
Lebanon, 2 Aug—29 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

LTCOL JAMES B. GLENNON, JR.

2d Prov Mar For  
Lebanon, 15 July—29 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

LTCOL HARRY A HADD

2d Bn, 2d Marines  
Lebanon, 15 July—14 Aug 1958

\* \* \*

LTCOL ROBERT M. JENKINS

3d Bn, 6th Marines  
Lebanon, 16 July—29 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

LTCOL STANLEY N. MCLEOD

American Land Forces  
Lebanon, 11 Aug—30 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

LTCOL MARTIN C. ROTH

2d Prov Mar For  
Lebanon, 15 July—29 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

LTCOL NATHAN R. SMITH

2d Prov Mar For  
Lebanon, 15 July—29 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

LTCOL ALFRED A. TILLMANN

2d Bn, 8th Marines  
Lebanon, 23 July—16 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

LTCOL ROBERT S. WILSON

2d Prov Mar For  
Lebanon, 26 July—14 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

MAJ LAWRENCE J. BRADLEY

2d Prov Mar For  
Lebanon, 16 July—7 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

MAJ WILBUR J. BUSS

2d Prov Mar For  
Lebanon, 15 July—29 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

MAJ RICHARD L. MICHAEL, JR.

1st Bn, 8th Marines  
Lebanon, 18 July—15 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

MAJ PAUL R. NUGENT

2d Bn, 2d Marines  
Lebanon, 15 July—15 Aug 1958

\* \* \*

MAJ SAMUEL C. ROACH, JR.

American Land Forces  
Lebanon, 19 July—16 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

MAJ THOMAS B. SPARKMAN

2d Prov Mar For  
Lebanon, 15 July—29 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

MAJ VICTOR STOYANOW

1st Bn, 8th Marines  
Lebanon, 18 July—15 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

MAJ PAUL R. UFFELMAN

2d Prov Mar For  
Lebanon, 23 July—27 Sept 1958

\* \* \*

MAJ VICTOR E. WADE

Mobile, Ala., 29 Aug 1957

\* \* \*

# LET'S TRAIN

By Capt Robert Lindsay, USMCR



# NBY TELEVISION

♦ **ALTHOUGH AN INTEGRAL PART OF** our way of life for the better part of a decade now, TV remains a mystery-shrouded medium, its output of assorted entertainment coming to us from a sort of never-never land of high-pressure salesmanship and show business hoopla. Yet the adaptability of this newest of the communication media for the military is already close to being old hat. The Army Signal Corps has long since demonstrated the versatility and usefulness of TV in a variety of combat situations at both tactical and strategic levels. And most of us are aware that TV is also extremely valuable in aiding military research in a number of ways.

There is yet a third area for the military utilization of TV: its unique and challenging value as a training aid. Instruction, of many types, by television is well past the experimental stage among civilian and vocational institutions.

It has been 8 years since the Navy's Special Devices Center conducted its first study of TV instruction vs conventional classroom instruction. Using classes of Navy air reservists, the study found that in about 77 per cent of comparisons made, instruction by either closed-circuit TV or kinescope recordings was *equal to or better than* conventional classroom teaching. A later study among 3,000 Army reservists of all ranks, officer and enlisted, showed that *all students* scored "significant learning gains" from instruction via TV, and that retention of the material was "substantial" up to 6 weeks.

Another military study of TV as an instructional device was conducted for the Army by George Washington University's Human Resources Research Office. This oft-cited study showed these results, among others:

- 1) That instruction by TV was at least as effective as conventional instruction;
- 2) That instruction by TV was more effective for low aptitude groups (*i.e.*, slow learners);
- 3) That instruction received by

TV was retained at least as well as conventional instruction.

Among civilian educators, the belief that TV instruction is practical, efficacious and economical is fast becoming accepted fact.

The suggestion would seem overdue, then, that the Marine Corps should give serious attention to the uses of television as a training and teaching tool, to integrate the medium within its arsenal of instructional know-how. There are two cogent reasons for this suggestion.

One factor is the fast-growing acceptance of TV by military and civilian educators as a legitimate, important tool for both the presentation and the assimilation of information of many kinds.

The other factor would be the unprecedented opportunity TV affords the Marine Corps to achieve a demonstrable economy in both the funds and the personnel presently involved in its vast program of professional education for all Marines.

Training depends upon both formal schooling and "on-the-job" instruction. In some respects, we think of Quantico as the fount of most of our basic training doctrine. But schooling, or training, is a function — indeed, a command responsibility — of every ship and station, of every unit. Marines take justifiable pride in both the quality and the results of their training. And at Quantico, in the pages of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, and in bull sessions everywhere, Marines constantly critique their training, suggesting and agitating for new and improved training techniques. Now comes this proposition: that in television the Marine Corps has yet another vehicle for carrying to colonel, sergeant, and private the benefits of past experience and present wisdom.

Before going further in this discussion of TV as a training tool, I should point out that I do not by any means propose that the Marine Corps get into the television *business*. Vast studios, expensive equipment, large numbers of special technicians are *not* required for closed-



circuit TV instruction. Some initial outlay for basic capital equipment would of course be necessary, but the savings that could be achieved through reductions in training personnel and facilities alone, would pay for such outlay within a very short time. Further, it is probable that closed-circuit facilities (to produce kinescope recordings, among other purposes) at Quantico for the East Coast and at Camp Pendleton for the West Coast would serve, for a time at least, the needs of the entire Corps.

One pitfall to be avoided, however, is thinking of TV, from the training aid standpoint, as the same thing as film. Kinescope recordings offer these additional advantages: they are vastly less expensive to produce, hence can be re-shot more often when it becomes necessary to up-date obsolescent material; the flexibility of the new TV camera developments gives kinescopes the attribute of a greater range of simultaneous views; and, perhaps most important, there is good evidence that student retention of kinescoped material is at least equal to and quite possibly superior to that of film.

Closed-circuit telecasting of both instructional and "spot situations" (e.g., a talk by a visiting specialist, or a one-time demonstration of a new development) offers at least two pertinent advantages: such information can be both seen and heard *while it is being presented* by an almost unlimited number of viewers over receiving sets scattered throughout a post or station, and the telecast can be kinescoped for future showing. On the latter point, it is worthwhile to note that although a film (which is, remember, much more expensive to produce) can be shown many times over, it frequently is not available for re-telecasting as readily as a kinescope. In addition, the kinescope itself can be shown as a film, should close-circuit TV facilities be unavailable. This last gives the kinescope recording of a given segment of instruction, what might be thought of as yet another advantage: virtually limitless accessibility—important in getting some special and important information



**Capt Lindsay** enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1941 and was commissioned in 1949. He holds a Master of Arts degree from the University of Wisconsin and has served as a faculty member in the School of Journalism at that institution. He has been a radio news editor and commentator and is the author of the book: *This High Name: Public Relations and the U. S. Marine Corps*. He is now on the journalism faculty at the University of Minnesota.

before troops in remote or small stations.

If we are to use television for training, the appropriate question, "Can TV do an effective job of teaching?" must first be answered. Several research studies in this area have already been cited as evidence that it can. There was also a Navy study, conducted in cooperation with Fordham University, using cadets of the Merchant Marine Academy and Naval reservists. One significant finding was that the students *preferred* the telecourse method of instruction. ("Telecourse" is a new word in our language, meaning formal instruction given by television.)

Consider Quantico's famed demonstration of an assault on a fortified position. By all means, student officers should be given an on-the-ground look at the demonstration. But remember how the "narrator" of the demonstration struggles to have the students focus their attention first on a particular pillbox, then on the tanks coming in from the right flank, then on a particular squad leader, and so on? This is a tough teaching situation, with so much taking place before the students' eyes as they sit in the stands.

On television, this problem is neatly and effectively solved by having the director of the telecast "take" whatever "shot" of the action the instructor wants emphasized at any given moment—and that shot does the focusing of attention on the TV screen.

Further, the new Zoomar lenses can swoop in on individual actions and participants for closeups that bring the viewer within inches of the performance or performers. (Think how this would aid the instructor in small arms classes perched as he is on a stage where only those in the front rows can see how the recoil mechanism works. Big-screen

TV monitors, positioned throughout the classroom, would show *everyone* in the room a closeup of the smallest details.)

Preserving these advantages on kinescope, for later re-showing in the classroom, gives the instructor an unmatched opportunity to call close attention to important detail, while at the same time affording the student the opportunity to better grasp the "big picture" of the demonstration. And let's not forget that copies of such a kinescope could be shown, not only to Quantico students, but to Marines throughout the Corps.

In the same vein, consider what kinescope recordings of the demonstration cited—or of any other lecture, demonstration or field exercise—could mean in terms of wear and tear on instructors. Instead of having Maj B-103 come in after evening chow to re-hash a particularly knotty problem for eager (or backward) students, let 'em watch a kinescope of it—complete with sound-on-film narration. This has application, of course, in many instructional areas.

On the other hand, there is the problem of instruction given by the man who simply is not a good teacher. It cannot be claimed that TV would eliminate such flaws in military instruction, any more than directives to the effect that "you *will* be an effective instructor" can do it. But TV can help, for example, by kinescoping the *best* lecturer, or demonstrator, or discourser. This gives our schools at Quantico and elsewhere a permanent recording of the ultimate in Marine Corps instructional ability.

Certainly it is neither fair nor good sense to subject Marines of any rank to a level of teaching ability which literally may fluctuate from day to day.

By using its own resources to train

by television, the Marine Corps not only can assure itself of the best instruction available, it can also save money.

We can save money by cutting down, to a remarkable degree, the number of people serving as instructors. Again, Quantico provides a graphic example. No longer any need to maintain a stable of high priced help in, for example, the Basic School's Tactics Section. Perhaps just a skeleton teaching crew, whose main responsibility would be to see that the right kinescopes were delivered to the right projectionist in the right classroom at the right time, and to provide necessary on-the-ground instruction for field exercises.

Nor is TV only a "training aid" in the strictest meaning. It is training in itself. It combines all the best elements of other audio-visual devices, and has some mighty advantageous ones of its own. Further, it can do something for the Corps besides giving it recourse to the most modern of training media. It can open up whole new horizons of getting the word to all hands—quickly, economically, and by "his very self and voice."

The Commandant's annual Birthday Message can be kinescoped in advance, copies made, and be shipped to every ship, post, and station in time for every Marine to see and hear the Commandant on 10 November. To do this on ordinary film would be cost-prohibitive. For another example: if the Director of the Division of Reserve can't make it to the activation of a new Organized Reserve Unit, he can "be there" via a kinescoped greeting.

Or: the Commanding General at Camp Pendleton has something he wants to say to all hands but lacks auditorium facilities or sufficient loudspeakers to boom his message to thousands of troops, nor does he want too many man-hours lost for a ten-minute talk. But he can go before a camera in a tiny studio and talk to all his troops as they sit before closed-circuit viewing sets throughout the Camp.

The suggestion advanced here is not that television should be considered by the Marine Corps as a substitute for conventional training

methods. In the first place, you just can't replace the human being in social relations—be it in training Marines, the conduct of war or anything else. We can use TV, however, to supplement our more traditional training methods to give the instructor an additional peg upon which to hang his overall presentation. For television must always be thought of in terms of what it is—a training aid, not training *per se*.

To implement the rather comprehensive project advanced here, my suggestion would be that the Marine Corps institute "Television Training Units." I see these units as composed of a mere handful of cameramen, technicians and production specialists. Since the training of troops and students is the objective, operation and supervision of such a closed-circuit system at the major installations would be under the aegis of the appropriate operations and training echelons.

By processing its own kinescope recordings, the TvTU could save still more money for the Marine Corps (the most costly item in producing kinescopes lies in their processing). Like the Motion Picture Production Units, the TvTU's could be moved about from their home bases to other installations to telecast special instructional training events over the local closed-circuit facilities. The devices presently used in making kinescopes are normally considered permanent installations because of their weight, size and delicate mechanisms, but the time should not be far off when the devices can be transported and installed more easily and conveniently.

By initiating now the use of closed-circuit TV for abetting its training effort, the Marine Corps would be laying the foundation for a more ambitious program within a relatively short time. It is foreseeable, certainly, that the day will come when most of our installations within the continental limits will have TvTU's or their equivalents, televising not only locally-originated instruction and demonstrations but special events of all kinds, including the rapid—and visual—dissemination of important information. The economies in men, money, and time should be worth considering.

US MC

## A major novel about the Marines in Korea



# band of brothers

By Ernest Frankel

"... *Band of Brothers* ... is not only a terrific book but one of tremendous value to us all in its honest interpretation of the Corps to the public."

—Lieutenant General  
Merrill B. Twining, USMC

"... *Band of Brothers* is a magnificent and stirring testimony to American courage that will do much to reassure our faith in ourselves. I was moved from tears of sadness to tears of laughter. This is a great novel and will at long last end the literary famine of the Korean War."

—Leon Uris, Author of  
*Battle Cry* and *Exodus*

"... the fictional treatment in '*Band of Brothers*' [is such] that the whole arena of Korean warfare comes thru as fresh as an Ernie Pyle dispatch."

—Chicago Sunday Tribune

"... a story told with compassion and humor as well as naked realism ... As a book about Marines, this novel is unsurpassed. As a book about war, it is worthy of a place alongside Stephen Crane's '*Red Badge of Courage*,' ... and other recognized American classics."

—The Washington Post  
and Times Herald


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
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*Company*

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New York 11, N. Y.



# HOW TO LAND




*MOREST unit gets a safety check from ground crew.*

• A 50-TON ARRESTING UNIT, a mobile arresting unit used aboard aircraft carriers, is being used by the Marine Corps jet fighters landing on the Morest.

Dubbed the MOREST, the unit is being successfully used by the Marine Corps jet fighters landing on the Morest. The unit is put to use on ways that are wet and slippery or in recovery. It can also halt aircraft on its own power because of mechanical trouble.

Like carrier arresting units, the MOREST uses steel cables stretched across the runway, connected to winches capable of absorbing thousands of pounds of energy. This tremendous force can stop a jet aircraft landing at 130 mph in less than the length of a football field.

Despite its weight, the unit can be moved in 4 hours and be set up again in 4 hours.



*Mobile arresting unit snares F4D "Skyray" for a safe landing.*

# LASSO A JET

...G UN, a modified version of those  
..., is being used ashore to slow down  
...ers landing on a strip in southern For-

ST, a ground mobile arresting unit  
ed by MAG 11 to land its fast F4D  
put use to recover aircraft on run-  
slippy or too short for normal re-  
t aircraft unable to stop under their  
mechanical trouble.

g unit, the MOREST makes use of  
cross the runway. The cables are con-  
ble absorbing 18½ million foot-  
tremendous braking power can bring  
135mph to a complete stop in less  
than half a second.

...e unit can be dismantled in less than  
...in is hours.

US 7 MC



*Crew discusses operation after setting up at Formosan airstrip.*

*Cable catches supersonic jet fighter  
landing at 135 miles an hour.*





## IN BRIEF

**Guest speaker at a kick-off luncheon** at Camp Lejeune, N. C., to open the Marine Corps Association's membership drive was BGen S. R. Shaw, Secretary-Treasurer of the Association. Gen Shaw told the audience of nearly 300 officers and staff NCOs of the purpose of the drive and urged greater participation by Association members. The meeting was the first in a series of quarterly meetings planned at which guest speakers will be featured.



**Aircraft compass systems** now can be calibrated electronically in less time and at less expense with a system developed by Sperry Gyroscope Company.



By electrically rotating the equivalent of the earth's magnetic field about a parked aircraft, the check can be made in less than 2 hours and without moving the aircraft.

Formerly, the aircraft had to be moved about a full 360-degree circle while crewmen checked and compensated for error headings. The manual method also made it difficult to reduce magnetic heading errors to less than one degree. With the electronic system the errors can be reduced to one-tenth degree.

**Millions of classified military documents** originated prior to 1 Jan 1946 are now being downgraded or declassified.

A Defense Department directive has set in motion a plan to reduce the voluminous backlog of documents formerly classified Top Secret, Secret and Confidential. The directive cancels, except within a few limited categories, security classifications of documents which no longer need protection in the national interest.

The plan is expected to effect substantial savings by eliminating semi-annual inventories of Top Secret Documents downgraded to Secret and by reducing shipping and storage costs.




**Destroyer USS Edson**, named in honor of the late MajGen Merritt A. Edson, was commissioned 7 Nov at Charlestown Navy Yard, Boston, Mass. Gen Edson, winner of the Medal of Honor and 2 Navy Crosses, commanded the 1st Marine Raider Battalion in WWII.



**A 7.62mm version of the "Vulcan"** gun is now being developed by General Electric Company for fighter and light aircraft.

Linked with its own ammunition supply and power source it weighs



only 188 pounds and fits into a bullet-shaped container just 90 inches long and 10 inches in diameter. The small, 8-barreled weapon fires 6,000 to 10,000 rounds per minute.

**The Army's VZ-8P aerial jeep**, built and designed by Piasecki Aircraft Corporation, has successfully passed its first test flight.

The revolutionary, wingless vehicle rose vertically from the ground on 2 columns of air and hovered



under its own power. Company officials said positive control in every direction was achieved.

Combining the utility of the ground jeep with the hovering and flying capabilities of a small helicopter, the VTOL aircraft is the first to utilize horizontal ducted propellers within the body to achieve both vertical lift and forward flight.



**The Crown Prince Constantine of Greece** was a recent visitor at MCS, Quantico, Va., as part of his tour of military installations in the US. Shown conversing with His Highness are LtGen Merrill B. Twining, Commandant of MCS, and Mrs. Twining.



**An organizational meeting** to form a Washington Area Chapter of the 3d MarDiv Association was held in the nation's capital 12 Dec. Called by Tom Stowe, Regional Vice President of the Association, the meeting brought together former Marines who have served in the division and are now residing in the District of Columbia area. The division's reunion will be held in Washington, next summer.

# SURVIVAL THROUGH **DISCIPLINE**

By MajGen H. L. Litzenberg

DISCIPLINE IS THE GLUE THAT holds an organization together when the going gets tough. It is the thing that distinguishes an organized body of men from a mob.

A mob may be incited to violence by a few leaders, but when the excitement of the moment dies down or when the mob runs into organized opposition, combined effort fails. Each individual acts for himself. The mob ceases even to be a mob. It becomes a crowd in panic, with no capability for united effort, either to accomplish a mission, or even extricate its members from danger.

On the other hand, an organized body of disciplined men is responsive to the will of the leader under all circumstances. Once a mission has been determined, individuals unite their efforts to accomplish it. They know that, whatever their personal danger may be, their best chance of success and sometimes even their chance of survival, depends upon acting as a unit and carrying out orders to the letter. Let me give you an example.

On 27 Nov 1950, the 5th and 7th Regimental Combat Teams of the 1stMarDiv were attacking in the vicinity of Yudam-ni, on the west side of the Chosin Reservoir in North Korea. That night, those 8000 Marines were counterattacked by elements of 5 Communist divisions—about 50,000 of the enemy. The odds were 6 to 1 against the Marines. In this mountainous region, the ground was frozen and covered with snow. At night, the

temperature dropped to 24 degrees below zero. Ammunition, food, and even blood plasma had to be resupplied by air drop. Those Marines fought there for 3 days and 3 nights. Then they were ordered to return to the south end of the Reservoir, where other Marines were surrounded and under constant attack.

One reinforced battalion at Yudam-ni was ordered to move at night, across the mountains where there were no trails and where even the Chinese could not operate. This battalion had been fighting constantly, day and night, for 6 days. The men were cold, tired, hungry, and since their plight seemed desperate, some were growing discouraged. Nevertheless, they loaded up with the extra ammunition needed for a heavy fight and started out. Before they could even reach the jumping-off place for their night march, they had to fight all the day long on 1 December to capture a hill which blocked their way. They reached its crest about dusk, reorganized, and, an hour later, started into the frozen, trackless mountains.

Officers and men carried packs, parkas, extra ammunition, sleeping bags and other equipment, each Marine burdened with 70 to 100 pounds of gear. In the darkness and bitter cold, they fought 3 engagements with the Chinese. In one instance they surprised a platoon asleep in their foxholes, and eliminated all of them. Then the exhausted column stopped briefly, after 17 hours of continuous fighting and marching.

When daylight came, it found

those Marines still 2 miles from their objective and surrounded by Chinese, who fired on them from all sides. At an order from their commander, the Marines took a suitable formation and moved out towards their objective, firing against the enemy on all 4 sides. Their wounded and dead were carried in the center of the formation on stretchers, borne by men who could hardly stumble along.

Just before noon, the Marines reached their objective: a Marine rifle company surrounded in a key mountain pass that had to be held if the other 7000 Marines, many of them wounded and frost-bitten, were to come over the road from Yudam-ni. The pass was held, and the Marines came out.

How did they do it? The answer is *discipline*. It was discipline of the mind, which enabled men to keep going beyond the point of physical exhaustion, so that they automatically carried out the actions of combat when fingers were stiff with cold and brains were numbed with pain and fatigue. It was moral discipline, self-control of the emotions, which fought off fear and despair and called back "DO IT!!" when aching muscles and bursting lungs cried "QUIT!" It was discipline of the organization, which had molded individuals into a fighting team of which obedience was the life-blood.

Such discipline is not a grace given in a moment of emergency. It is a virtue acquired by practicing obedience and self-control. USMC

# FOR TO DECEIVE

By Maj Reginald Hargreaves

*We keep hammering along with the conviction that "honesty is the best policy"; these pretty sentences do well for a child's copy-book, but the man who acts upon them in war had better sheath his sword for ever.*

FIELD MARSHAL LORD WOLSELEY



4 THERE IS AN ANCIENT PROVERB which affirms that "there are more ways of killing a cat than by wringing its neck." Something of a grim aphorism, there can be no question that in warfare occasions often arise when, metaphorically speaking, its application is singularly appropriate.

On most occasions, of course, superior force at the right place at the right time is the only way to get the better of an enemy. Even so, before such a superiority of force can be brought to bear, the enemy must be deceived as to your real intention. Otherwise your concentration may well find itself confronted by an

even more powerful aggregation of hostile troops. In effect, deception—in all its ramifications of denying information as well as disseminating false intelligence and conveying erroneous impressions—is as legitimate a device of war as the strength, in men and matériel, to which it so often plays the useful servitor. Over and over again, it has proved the salvation of the overmatched, while no force has ever been so strong that it could afford entirely to dispense with it. Finally, it is equally of service to the offensive as to the defensive; to the largest body of fighting men as to the smallest.



A static or routine form of deception is to be found in the use of camouflage: the disguise of everything, from a permanent factory building to a self-propelled gun, to which it is desirable that enemy attention should not be drawn. How enormously helpful this can be has been demonstrated on countless occasions, but perhaps never more so than on the eve of the Alamein battle in the autumn of 1942. For there was nothing but open desert upon which to deploy the stupendous concentration of ammunition, petrol, reserve rations and multitudinous engineer stores which the Eighth Army's coming offensive demanded. Yet the build-up was never discovered either by reconnaissance planes or probing intelligence patrols.

A more fluid form of defensive—and offensive—deceptive camouflage is to be found in smoke. Navies have used it on innumerable occasions, to obscure a tactical change of course or to shield capital ships from the eyes of their opponents. At the time of the Normandy landings, for example, the relatively immobile bombarding fleet was protected from the counter-battery fire of a concentration of heavy guns, sited at the mouth of the river Orne, by a blinding smoke screen laid down by Allied aircraft.

Smoke no less played its deceptive part as a static defense against air raids. From 1941 onwards, for example, anyone travelling along the narrow highway between Frenham and Portsmouth would have observed row upon row of mobile smoke-generators standing by to blanket the great naval base under a pall of blinding fume. As a device it proved as baffling to the enemy bomber in search of a specific target as were the dummy airfields and movable "lakes" on which he so often wasted his load of high explosive. Not that there is anything particularly new about the employment of smoke in warfare. The ancient Greeks made considerable use of it in their naval battles; while at the siege of Ambracia in 189 BC, the Ætoliens smoked out the tunnelling Romans with the smother created by a great mass of feathers with which they had packed their counter-mines.

A striking example of the employment of smoke to aid the offensive occurred in the medieval England of 1381 AD. A popular insurrection against excessive and discriminatory taxation was headed by a certain Wat Tyler, self-appointed leader of a rebellious faction of Kentish farm laborers. With Tyler marching on London, one of his lieutenants, Robert Cave, set about the reduction of Rochester Castle, held in the King's name by Sir John Newton, who had sworn to defend the stronghold against all comers. Cave's first assault having ended in a bloody repulse, he drew off the survivors amongst his 4,000 followers and sat down to work out a less expensive method of gaining his objective. As it so happened, a strong breeze was blowing from inland in the direction of the castle's frowning walls. Gleefully making note of this, Cave gave orders for a couple of haystacks to be dragged up-wind and as close to the works as possible. This done, with water he made what the bee-wards call a "smudge," and in no time a heavy volume of smoke was swirling over the battlements, driving the defenders from their posts with their eyes streaming.

Under shield of the billowing smother, a feint attack was put in, followed by a full-scale assault by a strong body of men-at-arms, whose approach had been hidden by the clouds of smoke. With the ramparts scaled, the onfall was pressed so vigorously that the defense was speedily overpowered. In the outcome Sir John Newton, seeking to escape across the river disguised in a priest's robe, was pursued, his boat upset and his body, like that of his faithful squire, hacked to pieces in the water. Had Wat Tyler's fortunes prospered as well as those of his lieutenant, the whole course of Eng-

lish history might well have been altered. In any case, the ultimate collapse of the rebellion can in no sense be said to invalidate the ingenuity with which Robert Cave advantaged his attack by making smoke his ally.

When Charles II came to the throne in 1660, he found a navy so rotten with neglect as virtually to be impotent. And this at a time when the Dutch were determined to avenge themselves for the loss and humiliation they had suffered through the imposition of Oliver Cromwell's crippling Trade and Navigation Act of 1651. With the swashbuckling Cornelis de Witt ravaging the Medway and the coastal townships at the mouth of the Thames, another Dutch naval force, under the command of Michael de Ruijter set sail for Harwich, with the intention of effecting a forced landing.

At this period the Harwich estuary was protected by a permanent work named Landguard Fort; which was garrisoned by a few gunners and a handful of the Lord High Admiral's, the Duke of York and Albany's Maritime Regiment of Foot—better known in these days as the Royal Marines.

It was a fine clear morning in June when de Ruijter was sighted, bearing down from the north and hugging closely to the coast line. It was clear that the Dutch Admiral's intention was to come in on the flank of Landguard Fort and send a strong landing party in his ship's boats for the stronghold's capture. But to cross the intervening expanse of shoal water under the fire of the fort's artillery would be certain to entail heavy casualties. So, with admirable seamanship, de Ruijter maneuvered up wind until certain of his craft were in position to belch



**Maj Hargreaves, M.C.** (British Service) is a familiar name to students of military history. A veteran of line and general staff service in France and Gallipoli during WWI, he was retired on medical grounds in 1921. Upon retirement he concentrated on the serious study of history and has authored numerous books and articles in the field of Military Science. He now resides in Nr Basingstoke, Hants, England.

been forth a heavy smoke screen which successfully obscured the line of approach and the actual strength of the hostile landing force. It was a deliberate attempt by the enemy commander to blind, and therefore to mislead, the garrison as to his intentions. For as a contemporary witness duly recorded, "It was judged that the 8 Dutch ships that sent such clouds of smoak upon the Fort . . . were merely for that purpose, and for to deceive."


But for all the ingenuity of their delivery, every assault on Landguard Fort was beaten off at heavy cost to the assailants. With the following day, the Dutch fleet abandoned the attempt on Harwich and morosely set sail for its home port. Even with deception to aid them, the "Mynheers" had not been able to get the better of the Marines.

A moment arose on the third day at Gettysburg when smoke might have been employed with extraordinary advantage to conceal the movement of troops. Shortly after 3 o'clock on that stiflingly hot afternoon, a strong body of Confederates moved out of the shelter of the woods on Seminary Ridge, to advance across a valley, totally devoid of cover, for the assault of the Federal position on the opposite crest. The distance to be traversed was a little under a mile.

At 800 yards the Federal cannon-fire began to wreak terrible havoc in the ranks of the advancing infantry, pressing on in close order and often forced to bunch through the need to tear down the fences on both sides of the Emmetsburg road, the gaps in which quickly became dangerously crowded.

Had Confederate counter-battery fire been ordered, it would, amongst other things, have acted as a deceptive smoke screen shielding the infantry's deployment. For as Federal Col Warren noted, such was the direction of the wind that "the puff of white smoke from a single cannon rolled along the whole valley parallel to the battle lines." So impressed was he by this phenomenon, indeed, that he deemed it "inexpedient to fill the valley with smoke before the Confederates came well within effective range," and so temporarily held his fire.

It is ironic to a degree that the



*"... made what the bee-wards call a smudge."*

Federals, to whom a smoke screen would have been a handicap, were swift to perceive what a help it would have been to opponents who apparently had given no thought to its employment. As a result, Pickett's assault of the ridge was as costly as it was gallant, not more than 6,000 achieving their objective out of the 18,000 who had debouched with such high hopes and dauntless courage from the woodland shadows into "the valley of the shadow of death."

Smoke can, of course, defeat its own object if a sudden change in the wind has the effect of blowing it clear of, or back upon, the troops or vessels it is designed to screen. At the battle of Waterloo, the heavy damp air pressed down on and held the cannon-smoke in the shallow valley separating the French and the Allied armies to such a degree that, at times, visibility for either belligerent was virtually nil.

Just 150 years later, smoke came accidentally to the rescue of the US 116th Regiment, landing in succession on either side of the Les Moulins exit from the Normandy beaches. For the German defense, blinded by the smother from the burning grass and blazing buildings

on the crest, set afire by the preliminary naval bombardment, put up far less opposition than had originally been anticipated.

Obviously smoke can be a useful aid to deception, but equally it can prove a weapon that turns viciously in the hand.

Everybody is acquainted with that device of the theater known as a "stage army," when perhaps a score of uniformed "supers" march solemnly across the stage to disappear through the wings, race round behind the backcloth and reappear—with probably a change of helmet and a false moustache—ostensibly as another contingent of the same body of troops.

It is a device of deception which has not infrequently been practiced on the field of battle itself.

For example, in April 1761, during the later stages of the Seven Years' War, an expedition was sent from England for the capture of the French stronghold of Belle Isle, on the French Atlantic coast. A very considerable British force had been mustered, far outnumbering the troops at the disposal of Belle Isle's Governor, M. Sainte Croix. With this formidable armament riding at

anchor off his principal fortress at *Le Palais*, the Frenchman's first concern was to try and impress the watching foe with the strength of his defense. Not only was every one of his 4 battalions — together with the Coast Guard, engineer and artillery contingents — set to marching and counter-marching in precisely the fashion of a stage army, but even the womenfolk of the garrison were called upon to take part in the attempted deception. Clad in uniform coats and laced tricorne hats, they were mounted on every available horse and cow and sent out to ride along the coast in cavalry formation, in full view of every "perspective glass" levelled from the warships in the offing.

It was a gallant bluff, and with a less phlegmatic opponent it might well have succeeded. But the British commander had his orders and, disregarding the heavy odds he apparently had been called upon to overcome, he proceeded to put them into execution. It proved no easy business, but in the end the tenacious *Sainte Croix* was driven to sue for terms; which were readily granted to so gallant and ingenious an opponent.

Better fortune attended a fortuitous repetition of *Sainte Croix's* device, when an invading force, organized by the French Directory, succeeded in landing at Fishguard, situated on a lonely stretch of the Welsh coast, in February 1797. The expedition was commanded by the veteran Col William Tate, an Irish-American who had served as an Officer of the 4th South Carolina Artillery Regiment throughout the American Revolution. Debarking unmolested and establishing his headquarters hard-by his landing point, Tate's first action was to send out patrols with orders to try and ascertain the strength of the local opposition. But their prime purpose was to try and arouse the countryside to the cause of revolution. For there was little that a force of no more than 1,300 officers and men could hope to achieve without the support forthcoming from a popular rising. Local opposition, if not too powerful, could probably be held in check while the republican emissaries got to work, but that was about all. In the meantime it proved

extraordinarily difficult to ascertain of what, precisely, that local opposition consisted.

Actually, the makeshift force, scraped together under the command of Lord Cawdor, amounted to no more than a squadron of Yeomanry cavalry, a raw militia contingent and a handful of naval ratings, rushed up from the seaport of Haverfordwest. With this meagre following, Cawdor promptly took the field; putting a bold front on appearance by sending Tate a peremptory message to throw down his arms. It was a colossal bluff which he was certainly in no position to validate with armed might. But Fate was working for him far better than he realized. For the unhappy Tate, already downcast by the failure of his emissaries to enlist any local support, looked out from his headquarters to observe the nearest line of hills stippled with an ever-shifting host arrayed in vivid scarlet, topped with headgear of sombre black. It was a combination rendered grimly familiar to the French by virtue of their previous encounters with the British Redcoat, crowned by his shako of polished black leather. In the face of so overwhelming an array, and with no means of evacuating his troops, Tate hesitated no longer. A messenger was sent post-haste to the British commander to assure him of the invader's readiness to make submission; and within a matter of hours the so-called "Army of Liberation" had been disarmed and was on the road to the prison hulks of Milford Haven.

It was only then that it was borne in on the unfortunate Tate that the formidable swarm in scarlet and black consisted of nothing more menacing than a horde of Welsh women, clad in their traditional garb of long red cloak and high "steeple" hat, who had hurriedly assembled from every point of the compass "to see the fun!"

An example of stupendous bluff, sustained by carefully planned deception, characterized the campaign of 1794 in the Netherlands, undertaken by the forces of the newly-created First French Republic. In its advance into Holland, Pichegru's *Armée du Nord* had experienced little difficulty in capturing Amsterdam; and the orders from Paris were

to push on until the whole of the north, up to Texel, had been brought under military control.

Commanding the army's attenuated advance-guard was a certain Col Louis Joseph Lahure. One of those hard-riding, hard-hitting cavalry commanders who combine a reckless dash with that inexhaustible resource which only comes from infinite experience, Lahure had no qualms of thrusting well ahead of his brigade. And this despite the fact that he had nothing more formidable at his heels than a single squadron of his own 8th Hussars, 3 shrunken battalions of *Chasseurs Tirailleurs* and a couple of light field guns. His first objective of any importance was the snug little town of Haarlem, which was far too well garrisoned to be left, unsubdued, in his rear.

Pressing on ahead of his troops, Lahure quickly learned that rumors of a general peace settlement — which actually had no substance — had reached the ears of the cautious burghers of Haarlem, but that the town's military governor, Van Thiis, was inflexibly determined to resist any attempt to enforce the stronghold's surrender. This intelligence the wily Hussar colonel pondered carefully; for with the garrison and townsfolk already at loggerheads as to the advisability of resistance, a bold front, backed up by a little carefully planned deception, should suffice to bring about Haarlem's capitulation without the firing of a single shot. And there is a time to be courageous, and a time to substitute brains for brawn.

Halting his troops well out of sight of the town, Lahure summoned his leading subordinates and gave them orders which speedily saw the column split up into 3 detachments, which hurried off in different directions. So far as any watching eye in Haarlem was concerned, their movements were entirely concealed by those configurations of the ground which Lahure, with his cavalryman's "quick eye for country," had instantly observed.

There was an *auberge* in the tiny hamlet where Lahure had deemed it wise to halt his troops; and while he was enjoying a glass of the local schnapps the Hussar colonel gave orders for a horse to be put in the



... those who had no horses rode on cows.

inn's rather dilapidated open carriage and a coachman found to drive him into town!

So it came about that, a little later, Governor Van Thiis was regaled with the spectacle of a languid-looking officer of Hussars lolling back on the cushions of a somewhat battered *barouche*, driving calmly toward his main town gate, escorted by a trumpeter and a single trooper carrying an improvised flag of truce. But his surprise at viewing this remarkable cavalcade was as nothing to his astonishment on hearing Lahure's cool demand for Haarlem's immediate and unconditional surrender.

The Governor's eye shifted quizzically from the lounging Lahure to the 2 stolid troopers, sitting motionless on their raw nags behind his carriage.

"Surrender to an army of 3, *M'sieu?*" he enquired sardonically.

For an answer, the Hussar colonel flicked a finger at the waiting trumpeter, who, putting his instrument to his lips, sent the shrill call of the *Alerte* ringing through the frosty air.

Instantly, from the edge of a small wood about a kilometer from the town, the heads of what looked like several columns of *Chasseurs Tirailleurs* debouched from the trees and came to a halt, awaiting further orders.

"You see, *Mynheer*," Lahure rasped at the slightly less confident Governor: "I come to demand the surrender of your town with only 2 men at

my back, because I know what overwhelming strength I can command by the mere sounding of a trumpet call."

"Hardly overwhelming," Van Thiis demurred; "a column of brigade strength, at the most."

Again Lahure flicked his finger at the trumpeter, and again the imperative summons of the *Alerte* was answered by the appearance, on the other side of the town, of the leading files of a mixed body of Horse and Foot; cresting a low ridge, down the reverse slope of which it was easy to imagine the rest of the force extended.

"It is not my habit, *Mynheer*," quoth Lahure, "to put all my goods in the shop window." Once more he signalled his trumpeter, and for the third time the trumpet's challenging call brought the head of a column into view; flanked by 2 pieces or artillery.

In the light of what could only be construed as the vanguard of a mass of troops of well over divisional strength, and with the rebellious mutterings of his principal burghers buzzing in his ears, Governor Van Thiis came to the unhappy conclusion that discretion was the better part of valor, and signified his willingness to surrender the town without further parley.

It was only when the squadron of the 8th had swiftly impounded all the garrison's weapons that it began to dawn on the infuriated Van Thiis that the *heads* of the columns he had

seen constituted *all* the troops at Lahure's disposal; that the garrison had been beguiled into throwing down its arms to a force considerably less than a third its strength.

Rarely can a combination of bluff and shrewd military deception have achieved so costless and satisfactory a result.

For the vanquished, of course, there is nothing so infuriating as to feel that they have been "diddled." As one very orthodox, cut-and-thrust, bull-at-a-gate old soldier put it, "Deception is all very well, and can be practiced up to a point; but beyond that point I call it sheer treachery!"

That is not the view taken by the world's great Captains. Gen Robert E. Lee, for one, resorted to the "stage army" device on the eve of the great "Seven Day Battle" in the summer of 1862; marching Magruder's 10,000 men "back and forth on a level of ground, into the woods and out again, giving an imitation for McClellan's observers of a vast horde preparing to slaughter its foe." This ruse, coupled with the delusive items Lee caused to be quietly inserted in the Richmond papers, thoroughly deceived his opponent as to his real strength. It even persuaded the shrewd Alan Pinkerton, head of the Federal "Intelligence" service, into a gross over-estimate of the Confederate resources. There were few tricks of the trade you could teach to Robert E. Lee!

If stage armies have played their part in the deception of an enemy, equally, occasions have arisen when stage weapons have been put to an equally useful purpose.

A striking example of this particular ruse occurred in 1798, on the heels of Nelson's smashing victory over the French at the battle of the Nile. Control of the Mediterranean had passed into British hands save that the valuable naval base at Minorca still remained in the grip of Spain; and Spain had not yet broken away from the thralldom imposed on her by revolutionary France.

It was clear that Minorca would have to be captured by force of arms; and on 7 November a body of troops — of no greater strength than 4 weak battalions — managed to effect a landing in the face of numerically powerful opposition from a

couple of thousand Spaniards. The British were led by Gen Sir Charles Stuart, a brilliantly resourceful commander and a man whose power of inspiring devotion in his followers bordered on the uncanny.

Minorca's 2 strongholds of Mahon and Ciudadela were at opposite ends of the island and some 50 miles apart. Stuart, promptly seizing the commanding pass of Mercadel on the only connecting road, at one blow contrived to split the enemy forces in twain. Learning that the bulk of the Spaniards had withdrawn to Ciudadela, the British Commander demanded the surrender of those remaining in Mahon and the place fell without a single shot being fired.

Ciudadela, however, with its numerous garrisons, heavy ordnance and stout defense works, promised to be a far harder nut to crack. For in addition to his 4 weak battalions, Stuart had nothing more than a handful of sailors and Marines. They were extraordinarily resourceful, willing and cheerful fellows, but numbered a mere 250. Furthermore, the only cannon at the Britisher's disposal were 6 light field pieces, the carriages for which had already fallen to pieces owing to the rough tracks over which they had been painfully transported—largely by the sailors and Marines.

Nothing dismayed, Stuart ordered the march on Ciudadela in 2 columns, and so artfully were they maneuvered that the Spaniards, deceived by their apparent strength, incontinently abandoned their outworks and withdrew within the walls of the city. Waiting until nightfall should conceal his movements, Stuart threw out a detachment to one of his flanks; and on the following morning this contingent advanced as though it were the head of yet a third strong column.

The Britisher's first summons to surrender having been ignored, Stuart promptly proceeded to throw up a most extensive system of earthworks, so cunningly sited as to give the—entirely fallacious—impression of a continuous, well-manned line of investment of over 4 miles in length. At the same time gun-embrasures were fashioned on a scale big enough to house the very heaviest siege artillery! In these emplacements the

half a dozen little pop-guns were supplemented by as many carefully planned tree trunks which, from a distance, gave all the appearance of heavy siege pieces.

The Spanish commander's response to this impressive display was a couple of wildly-aimed rounds from his bigger guns. To this demonstration Stuart dared not reply in kind lest he reveal that a battery of pop-guns was all he had upon which to rely. Instead, he sent in a flag of truce demanding instant surrender, lest he be under the painful necessity of turning loose his artillery and reducing Ciudadela to a heap of rubble! Completely deceived by his antagonist's colossal bluff, the Spanish commander hastily agreed to lay down his arms; and Minorca was in Stuart's pocket as the outcome of one of the most sustained and successful military deceptions ever practiced.

Many an army had stealthily bettered its position or effected a timely strategic withdrawal under cover of the night, leaving its watch-fires burning to delude the enemy into the belief that it was still holding fast in the position it had occupied when darkness came to obscure its movements. An elaboration of this ruse was successfully carried through by England's King Charles I during the early stages of the Civil War. Hemmed in by the Parliamentary troops of Essex and Waller, which had nearly encircled the city of Oxford, he gave orders for the watch fires to be lit and built up to last several hours. At the same time the hedgerows were strung with long coils of the bright-burning, slow-fire *link*, with which the arquebusier sets off the charge in his weapon; the idea being to personate a line of musketeers drawn up at the ready. The trick succeeded admirably; for as a contemporary chronicler has recorded, "Our soldiers hung' lighted match at the mill and bridge near Islip to cheat Essex, and so fairly left that place; the enemy shooting many times that night at the match in vain."

During a siege, *link* was often employed in feint attacks or fictitious sallies, when lengths of lighted match were stuck into balls of clay and then thrown down well forward of the besiegers' trenches, in order to

draw their fire. One brutal trick was perpetrated by a handful of Parliamentary troopers, who "out-turned" an old horse handsomely starred with matche, which appeared in the dark night, to draw the fire of the Malignants, until it fell full of shott."

Highly ingenious, no doubt, although pretty tough on the unfortunate horse; who had probably never even heard of the proverb which insists that "All's fair in love and war."

There are many deceptions practiced whose aim is to delude the enemy into the erroneous belief that he is confronted with more men than are actually on the spot. The device used in the film of *Beau Geste*, of propping up the corpses of the fallen between the fortress's battlements, has historical precedent going back as far as the Crusades. Even the wily Afghan, careful as he always was of ammunition, could be persuaded to take a pot-shot at a solar topee gently raised on the end of a stick; and he invariably drilled a neat hole clean through it. But unless the helmet's disappearance was accompanied by the convincing display of a body falling backwards, with upflung arms flailing the air, to repeat the trick was useless. He knew he had been "had for a sucker," and thereafter refused to "play ball."

It was the same with the Boers investing beleaguered Mafeking in the early days of the South African War. At the outset, the straw-dummies crowned with military slouch hats, could be relied upon to draw a well-aimed Mauser bullet every time they were gingerly hoisted over the sandbags. But "Brother Boojer" soon grew skeptical; and it was only when a sudden and entirely unexpected burst of accordion music accompanied the dummy's next appearance that half a dozen Boer heads popped up in astonishment out of their entrenchments—to be dealt with faithfully by the picked marksmen lying in wait.

(Incidentally, during the Belgian War of Independence of 1830, the principal barricade in the *Rue de l'Orangerie* was furnished with a dummy whose head—neatly crowned with a battered top hat—could be lowered by a cord, which at the same time jerked up the puppet's arms in



**"... a dummy whose head could be lowered by a cord."**

tified Beersheba flank. Consequently, the effect of surprise gained when he sent them galloping into action, added enormously to the demoralization of the enemy against whom they were hurled.

Again, in 1944, the success of the "cover" plan for the Normandy landings, with its delusive concentration of troops and shipping, to give the impression that the real blow was to be aimed at the Calais-Boulogne area, kept Rundstedt guessing even after the establishment of a substantial bridge-head on the Cotentin peninsula.

The moment must come, of course, when nothing other than a straight-forward "sealed pattern" military movement, "according to the book," will be adequate to deal successfully with the existent situation. But it is astonishing how often wit can come to the aid of brawn, with a consequent saving in life, in the expenditure of valuable matériel not easily or swiftly to be replaced, and in time itself.

Contemplating British preparations for the head-on, bull-at-a-gate assault on Spion Kop, the American military attaché to the forces in South Africa, Col Slocum of the 6th US Cavalry, inquired very pertinently, "Isn't there a way round?"

It is a question that many a present-day platoon or company, or even battalion commander might often ask himself with very considerable advantage. Too often advancing

troops, coming into contact with the enemy, will halt short in their tracks and send an immediate signal for every support weapon within miles to blast away at the opposition — without any particular knowledge as to its strength — with tanks rushing in on the heels of an air strike powerful enough to shatter a division. Casualties meanwhile have been piling up in the platoon or company halted on the road — rather than deployed to either side of it — and when at last the forward movement is resumed, the scale of expenditure, in men and matériel recently indulged in, is found to have been out of all proportion to the degree of opposition that had to be overcome. It has indeed been an example of bringing up a Nasmythe hammer to crack a walnut. And had the situation only been investigated, there is every possibility that someone would have lighted on a much quicker and cheaper "way round."

For Gen Patton's axiom, "Hold him by the nose with fire and kick him in the pants with movement," applies as much today as ever it did. But to operate along these lines successfully demands at least a modicum of guile — guile, the ever-ready servitor of force.

As any student of war will unhesitatingly bear witness, it is astounding how often a little effort in deception, a beguiling ruse, a resort to sheer unadulterated bluff, will turn the trick far more expeditiously than strict adherence to "the book of the rules." Quick thinking and a lively touch of the imagination are assets in warfare whose value is virtually incalculable.

The great Duke of Wellington once affirmed that he had spent his whole military life guessing what was on the other side of the hill and round the next corner. If by guile and deception you can add to your opponents' difficulty in guessing what is on *your* side of the hill, then you will have him worried. And a worried enemy is one who has lost a great deal of the initiative.

As Sun Tsu, the master-tactician of China, once put it, "In war, practice deception and you will succeed." That is as true today as when it was first pronounced somewhere about 500 years BC.

US MC

a most realistic gesture of collapse. So popular a target did this prove that no less than 3 top hats were riddled beyond further use before the deception was finally penetrated.)

A favorite device employed to trick the Boers into the belief that a long convoy was on the move behind the shelter of a low range of *koppies*, was based on the probability that a false diagnosis would be drawn from such facts as could be adduced. With their actual movement concealed from view, half a dozen limbers, carefully spaced out, would proceed across the crumbly surface of the *veldt*, each with a stout thorn bush roped to its tail. In less than no time an enormous cloud of dust would swirl up into the sky, giving the watching Boers the impression that a heavy column of all arms was on the move and — however many men might be involved in the task — had better be kept under observation. It was a long time before the ruse was fathomed.

Another subtle little deception was that practiced by Gen Sir George White, the defender of the hard-pressed, half-starved stronghold of Ladysmith. Whenever the necessity arose to send an officer to parley with the Boers over the exchange of prisoners or any other similar matter, the duty was always confided to the same aide-de-camp, kept on full rations when everyone else was down to remarkably short commons. As was only to be expected, the emissary's amply nourished body and air of well-fed, glowing health completely deluded the Boer negotiators into the belief that the town's garrison was infinitely better off for supplies than was actually the case.

When intelligence of the ruse reached the equally hungry inmates of besieged Mafeking, the rush to play the part of envoy included practically the whole of the town's male population!

Large-scale deceptions are, of course, considerably harder to achieve than the more modest ruses resorted to by relatively small bodies of troops. Yet Field Marshal Lord Allenby, during the last-minute preparations for his attack on the Turkish stronghold of Gaza, succeeded in hiding all the men and horses of his cavalry division in the orange grove facing the strongly for-

# THE JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC WAR

This is the third and final installment from the book *The Japanese Army in the Pacific War*, secondly published by the Association.

By Saburo Hayashi  
In collaboration with Dr. Alvin Coox

DEFEAT

IN JUNE 1944 (WHEN MARIAN fell) whispers were heard in the Army High Command circles to the effect that it was almost hopeless to win the war any longer. This view derived from the fact that, in the Midway operation, American forces made use of their island bases to deal a heavy blow to the invading Japanese, and fully manifested the power inherent in island bases. During the Marianas campaign, however, Japanese island bastions were eliminated within a short time. As a consequence the Japanese were dismayed by the terrific difference between the power of the US and Japanese navies and air forces. It was felt that the disadvantages would only increase thereafter.

At about that time, two or three IGHQ staff officers advised Chief of Staff Tojo that there was no prospect of victory and that peace should be concluded quickly.

Previously, among the War Ministry authorities concerned with the mobilization of material resources, voices despairing of the war situation were heard as early as 1943. From the viewpoints of steel production and of shipping losses (which far exceeded prewar estimates), there

appeared to exist almost no hope of victory. Around July and August of the same year, there also arose an undercurrent of opinion within the headquarters of the Army Ordnance Department, to the effect that no high prospects were in sight, so far as war materiel was concerned.

In June 1944, when the Allied Second Front was opened in Europe, the Army High Command reached the conclusion that Germany's capitulation was a matter of time. When the Reich surrendered in May 1945, they were therefore not very surprised. The Command nevertheless was gloomy about the future, since they had a foreboding that the main strength of the Anglo-American forces would be directed for use in the campaign against Japan, and that the Soviet Union's entry into the war was near at hand. In certain quarters, various studies were made concerning peace moves and the prevention of Soviet entry into hostilities against Japan (as we shall soon see).

Pessimistic views about the overall military picture were not voiced at large gatherings, however, or at public meetings. In such cases the opinion always prevailed that the



On Saipan

Hashimoto Yaeji

war must be won at any cost, by waging a decisive struggle in the homeland. This was due to the belief that soldiers should make every effort to foster a warlike spirit for the achievement of victory, until cease-fire orders were eventually issued.

From around April 1945, the Army High Command's Second Bureau (Intelligence) began secretly to investigate peace overtures toward the Chungking (Nationalist) and Yen'an (Chinese Communist) authorities, based upon a recognition that the war had entered upon its last stage and that it was time to make every possible effort to bring about its conclusion. With the surrender of Germany, these studies were pushed even more seriously.

As a result of its studies, the Second Bureau pinned high hopes upon peace moves toward Yen'an. There were two notions, however, in regard to the object of the overtures: One idea was that peace should be negotiated with Yen'an in order to restrain Chungking; the other was that efforts should be made to prevent Soviet entry into the Pacific War by approaching the Russians through Yen'an.

The Army High Command covertly began to broach Yen'an by sending men engaged in peace feelers to North and Central China. Since the moves were originally devised with no hopes of success, but only in an effort to determine the possibilities, no progress could ever be observed by war's end.


Independently of the central authorities' opinion concerning peace with Chungking, the China Expeditionary Army saw the necessity of changing the war situation. That army therefore dispatched Deputy Chief of Staff Imai to Hsintanchi (Hsintienchi), south of Chouchiakou in Honan Province. There he negotiated directly with Chungking's Gen Ho Chukuo, Deputy Commander of the Tenth Military District (War Sector Army) and concurrently Commander of the Fifteenth Army Group. The peace conditions of the Japanese provided for the preservation of the national polity and the safeguarding of territorial integrity, but the overtures ended in failure.

An undercurrent of pessimism concerning the outlook of the war lingered on in a corner of the Army central authorities' stronghold; but movement in general was being

pushed toward preparing for a decisive battle in the homeland, with might and main.

The gist of the operational plan concerning the decisive struggle in the homeland has been presented earlier. To recapitulate: In the plan, the Army High Command sought chances for victory in the following ways: The entire air force should attack American transports and task forces with a *Tokko* (special attack) spirit, inflicting severe losses upon the foe. Attempts should be made to annihilate American troop landings near the debarkation sites, in truly death-defying combat. In case the American landings could not be stemmed, a volunteer army system (consisting of the military, officialdom, and the citizenry) should together continue resistance inland. By their collective military efforts, the Japanese would cause the US forces to realize the tremendous sacrifices in manpower that they would have to expend during any invasion of the Japanese homeland.

In appraising the characteristics of operations to defend Japan Proper, the Army High Command judged that the odds were not impossible, for a number of reasons:



**Convoy Escort**

Okubo Sakujiro

In any decisive battle for the homeland, there would be no fear that Japanese shipping would be sunk (unlike the situation during the previous island campaigns). Since many airfields had been set up, it had become possible to preserve planes from severe bombing by US forces prior to landings. The main strength of the Army remained almost intact and, since the battles would be fought ashore, it could operate very well without the Navy. American landing operations against the Japanese homeland would require more than three times the number of transports used in the war against Germany; hence there would be more chances to attack the US supply lines which extended across great distances. Taking advantage of the actual American landings, the Japanese Army would be able to inflict heavy casualties by employing strong points prepared beforehand; etc.

Army leaders seized the opportunity to instruct the officers and men about the proper mental attitude toward the decisive campaign in Japan Proper. Salient precepts are treated below.

Gen Shizuichi Tanaka (who had once been Military Attaché to the

United States) penned an article entitled "The Way to Sure Victory" in which he emphasized the following points:

"American troops, when the military situation develops somewhat favorably for them, tend to launch bold and reckless headlong rushes. That very time is best to deal them a heavy blow, by conducting surprise attacks.

"If we risk our lives and kill several enemy soldiers with one, I think we shall be able to break the enemy's will to fight."

This concept can be said to have represented the Army's opinion of American forces, to a certain degree.

Gen Umezu, the Chief of the General Staff, wrote an article called "Facing the General Decisive Battle," in which he stressed that:

"The certain way to victory during the course of the general decisive battle lies in making everything on Imperial soil contribute to the war effort; and in combining the total fighting strength of the nation, both material and spiritual, to annihilate the invading American forces.

"In particular, the establishment of a metaphysical spirit for waging the decisive battle is the first rule.

What should be remembered above all in carrying out the general decisive battle is adherence to a vigorous spirit of attack."

On 8 April 1945, War Minister Anami promulgated *Precepts concerning the Decisive Battle* for dissemination to the entire Army. He directed both officers and men to abide by these instructions in waging the decisive battle on Imperial soil.

The precepts stipulated that Imperial Army officers and men should:

- 1) obey the Imperial Rescripts and proceed to abide by the Imperial Will;
- 2) defend Imperial soil to the last;
- 3) await the future, after preparations have been effected;
- 4) possess a deep-seated spirit of ramming (suicide);
- 5) set the example for 100,000,000 compatriots.

Like the *Field Service Code* (*Senjinkun*) issued by the War Minister Tojo just before the outbreak of the Pacific War, the preceding injunctions discussed nothing technical.

As the war situation grew worse, confidence in sure victory was increasingly stressed within the Army. From the first, the phrase "to be

defeated" was interpreted as "to feel yourself defeated." Stemming from this point of view, adherence to a confident belief in certain victory was emphasized at every opportunity, but the import was not always clear. For example, it was not clear whether confidence in certain victory meant "sure to win and able to win"; or "must win by all means"; or whether it involved both of these types of confidence. Most officers and men had an easy-going confidence of winning ("certain to win," and "able to win for sure") — without any sense of effort.

Although it was declared that there were prospects of success in the decisive battle for the homeland, this did not imply confidence of defeating the American forces' second and third landings when made continuously. All of the Army High Command felt secretly (when they considered the course of the decisive battle in the homeland coolly and concretely) that it was impossible to defeat the American troop landings because of lack of weapons, ammunition and food, in case second and third landings were made one after another. This held true even if the initial American landing *could* be frustrated.

We have seen earlier that the voice of the War Ministry had grown louder within the Army ever since the period of preparation for the decisive campaign in Japan. In August the bulk of the members of the Military Affairs Bureau (the core of the War Ministry) began to gather in a group centering around War Minister Anami.

The Army held the general view that a cessation of hostilities should be determined by the Government. It devoted itself to preparations for a decisive battle in the homeland, in the belief that (as long as the war lasted) it should fight on with all of its might. As a matter of fact, however, the people who directed military operations had, at the same time, a great influence in politics. This was because the Army had penetrated too deeply into the political and economic spheres of the nation, and because the war situation was unfavorable. Hence the influence of Army views upon politics was commensurately stronger.

When the Government was faced



**Last Moments of Admiral Yamaguchi**

Kita Renzo

with the problem of accepting the Potsdam Declaration, the core of the Military Affairs Bureau exerted great pressure upon War Minister Anami, stressing that he should prevent acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. Otherwise it would prove impossible to retain the national polity and keep the Army in line. If Anami could not do this, he had better commit *harakiri*: Thus was the War Minister driven to the wall.

On 11 August, the War Minister's instructions (dealing with the continuation of resistance, but whose publication had not been authorized beforehand by the Minister) appeared in the newspapers. Anami, however, did not resolutely punish the persons responsible for this violation of Army Regulations. This lent the strong impression to the Army's central authorities that the War Minister was in favor of resistance to the last, and rendered his political position more and more cramped.

Soon the influence of the War Minister's instructions became apparent. On the night of 13 August, several section members of the War Ministry's Military Affairs Bureau (including Military Affairs Section Chief Arao) visited the War Minister's official residence. They advised Gen Anami to effect a *coup d'état* in order to establish a setup capable of continuing resistance. The War Minister did not, at the time, clearly

express his intentions concerning the execution of a *coup*.

At midnight on the same day, War Minister Anami summoned Arao alone to the Minister's Room in the Ministry. There he told him of his disagreement with any *coup d'état*, using roundabout expressions. Gen Anami's attitude nevertheless seems to have given the impression to certain section members of the Military Affairs Bureau that he was inwardly in agreement with a *coup d'état*.

About that time, War Minister Anami (worried about the eventuality of an emergency) summoned Gendarmerie Commander Okido, and advised him that important orders would be directly issued by the Minister or by the Vice-Minister (meaning that Okido should beware of false Ministry orders). Anami also called in the Commander of the Imperial Guard Division (Gen Mori) cautioning him to leave nothing undone in carefully guarding the Imperial Palace.

The section members in the Military Affairs Bureau were the ones who ought to have known the true facts about the national strength of Japan. On one occasion, when the High Command had submitted an operational request, they had rejected it on the basis of national capabilities.

The section members took the lead in continuing resistance, prob-

ably because of strong fears that if the Potsdam Declaration were accepted it would prove impossible to preserve the national polity, and the Army would collapse — rather than because of confidence in victory.

Gen Anami also continued to act as though he were eager to prolong resistance. Deep in the War Minister's heart, however, lay the idea of engaging the invading American forces and, after once beating them into the sea, seizing the opportunity to proceed toward peace.

As for the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, Gen Anami was very concerned about the preservation of the national polity and the disarmament of the Army. He intended to convert "unconditional" into "conditional" surrender, somehow. With the covert notion of asking the Emperor to desist from unconditional acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the War Minister therefore visited Prince Mikasa on the night of 12 August. The Prince even scolded him, however, saying that "the Army had been acting contrary to the will of the Emperor, ever since the time of the Manchurian Incident."

On the morning of the 12th, the War Minister paid a call upon Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. On the same day he also requested Marshal Hata, an Army elder, to come to Tokyo (from Hiroshima), and took steps to have the Marshal report to the Emperor concerning the feeling within the Army.

At the Imperial Conference conducted on 14 August, the Emperor's decision to end the war was handed down. In accordance with the Imperial Decision, instructions were issued at Army Headquarters by the War Minister and by the Chief of the General Staff, to the effect that the end of the Imperial Army should come about with honor.

A confused atmosphere nevertheless prevailed at Ichigaya Heights. All through the night, everywhere on the Heights, heaps of documents were burned indiscriminately. Rumors were rife that a powerful American landing force had already arrived outside Tokyo Bay, or that landings by US troops were near at hand, which made people extremely uneasy. A sort of panic arose, and there were a large number of de-

serters from among the guards at IGHQ and the gendarmerie guarding the War Ministry. Here, unexpectedly, was revealed one aspect of the Japanese Army: fragileness in the face of violent changes in the situation.

Two or three section members of the Military Affairs Bureau still clung to the belief that they should get rid of the corrupt elements attending the Emperor, continue resistance under His Majesty, and preserve the national polity.

The plan seemed to call for the rousing of the Imperial Guard Division, first; and then of the Eastern Army. If the latter could be induced to rise (the conspirators) would urge War Minister Anami to do likewise. Then, finally, they would push straight on with resist-



ance under the Emperor, with renewed determination that 100,000,000 people would die rather than surrender.

On the night of the 14th, the preceding plan was put into action, around the hard core provided by two or three section members of the Military Affairs Bureau. The Commander of the Imperial Guard Division, Gen Mori, was cut down because he would not budge even an inch. A false order from the Imperial Guard Division was then issued. Various units of the Division proceeded toward the Imperial Palace, where efforts were made to lay hands upon the record which the Emperor had transcribed. The whole affair ended in failure, however.

Learning of these developments,

the Eastern Army District Commander, Gen Tanaka, lost no time rushing alone to the site of the disturbance within the Imperial Palace. He prevailed upon the leading officers (to give up), whereupon the incident was soon settled.

In the early hours of the 15th, War Minister Anami committed suicide at his official residence. He left two wills. One (drawn up in his capacity as War Minister) stated: "With my death, I humbly apologize to the Emperor for my grave offenses." Judging from remarks made by the War Minister before his suicide, his death was thought to constitute an apology for the Japanese Army's actions, mainly from the time of the Manchurian Incident until the end of the Pacific War (including the Imperial Guard Division affair).

It was decided on 16 August that Prince Takeda should be sent to Manchuria, Prince Asaka to China, and Prince Kanin to the South, in order to convey the Imperial Message concerning the cessation of hostilities. Field commanders of all ranks obeyed the will of the Emperor, bearing the unbearable, and trying to control the troops under their command. As a result the termination of hostilities proceeded smoothly. Disarmament was afterward carried out with no hitch.

At this time, the core of the Japanese Army was made up of 169 infantry divisions, 4 tank divisions, and 15 air divisions (including air divisions organized by training units). Over-all personnel strength approximated 5,550,000 officers and men. Aircraft numbered about 9,000 (including 6,000 for use in the homeland).

Demobilization proceeded satisfactorily. Those discharged at home numbered 2,350,000; those demobilized overseas, about 2,700,000 (by March 1950). In addition, those not yet repatriated from the Soviet Union and from Communist China — plus the missing — totaled some 500,000.

Japanese Army dead numbered about 1,130,000 during the course of the Pacific War, including those who were killed in action, died of wounds, or perished from disease.

US MC

# Prize Essay Contest

## CLASSIFICATIONS

- Group I: Field Grade Officers; Civilians**
- Group II: Company Grade Officers**
- Group III: Enlisted**
- Group IV: Members of the Platoon Leaders Class, Marine Corps Option NROTC, Officer Candidates Class and NAVCADs.**

(Prospective officers may enter Group IV if they have not received their commission at the time the essay is submitted.)

A total of \$2,000.00 will be awarded to the winners of the Marine Corps Association's 1959 Prize Essay Contest. Essays will be judged in the 4 classifications, determined by the status of the contestant (active, inactive or retired member of the Armed Forces of the US and its Allies or as a civilian). A prize of \$500.00 will be awarded to the winner in each group. If no essay entered in the contest is of a sufficiently high standard of excellence, no prize will be awarded in the classification concerned. In the event of a tie, awards may be prorated.

Material dealing with original thinking on military subjects is particularly desired. Historical essays are not solicited unless they can point up some development or far-reaching thought that affects us directly today.

In addition to the prizes awarded, one or more essays may receive "Honorable Mention" and be accepted for publication. Those not receiving a prize or honorable mention may be accepted for general publication in the GAZETTE. Compensation for such articles will be as adjudged by the Editorial Board.

## General Rules

1. Contestants may write on any subject of military interest but essays may not exceed 5,000 words and they must be original.
2. They must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8 x 11, and must be submitted in triplicate.
3. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each essay heading shall contain an identifying phrase consisting of the last 5 words of the essay. This phrase shall appear:
  - a) On the title page of the essay.
  - b) On the outside of a sealed envelope containing the name (rank and serial number, if any) of the author.
  - c) Above the name and address of the author, inside the identifying envelope.
4. Essays and identifying envelope must be mailed in a sealed envelope marked Prize Essay Contest Group (I, II, III, IV as appropriate) to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, Box 1844, Quantico, Virginia.
5. Essays must be received by the Secretary-Treasurer prior to 1 October 1959.

The copyright of any essay which appears in the GAZETTE is the property of the Marine Corps Association. No liability for the loss, return, judging or reports on any essay submitted will be assumed by the Marine Corps Association or the GAZETTE and the decisions of the Editorial Board will be final. No inquiries regarding essays will be answered until final judgment has been made.

**DEADLINE 1 OCTOBER 1959**

**The Marine Corps Association**



# BOOKS ON PARADE

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S. L. A. MARSHALL

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
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*Missiles*

**AGAINST**



BEVEAU



# TARMOR

By Richard M. Ogorkiewicz

THE RECENT APPEARANCE OF several short-range surface-to-surface guided missiles marks the emergence of this type of weapon from the purely experimental phase and its entry into that of production and field use. The event makes it highly appropriate to consider the development of these missiles and, as they are intended principally for an anti-tank role, to consider their impact upon the future employment of tanks in amphibious operations and on armor in general.

The short-range anti-tank guided missiles are basically rockets with shaped charge warheads which can be controlled in flight to achieve a high degree of accuracy. Their development began toward the end of WWII in Germany which managed to seize the initiative in the field of guided missiles, so much so that the majority of guided weapons developed since WWII have been

based on earlier German projects. One of these was the X-7, a wire controlled slow-spinning anti-tank rocket, work on which began in 1944 and which was about to go into production when Germany surrendered in May 1945.

The surrender stopped further development in Germany but after the war, in 1946, the X-7 type was taken up in France and evolved into the S.S.10, the first operational anti-tank guided missile. The *Sol-à-Sol*, or surface-to-surface, S.S.10 is a 33-pound missile, 33.9 inches long, with cruciform wings having a span of 29.5 inches and a maximum range of 1,750 yards. Its existence was first revealed in France in 1953 but it was actually evaluated by US Ordnance in 1950. Since then, apart from its extensive use in the French forces, it has been supplied to Sweden and West Germany and also to the Israeli Army which success-



fully used a few S.S.10's against Soviet-built Egyptian armor during the 1956 Sinai campaign.

In France the S.S.10, or Nord 5200, and the very similar Entac, have been followed by a further development of the Nord 5200 series, the S.S.11, or Nord 5210, which is similar in principle to the earlier missile but much faster and with twice the range. Anti-tank guided missiles similar to the S.S.10 and derived from the same original German X-7 have been developed also in Switzerland by the Oerlikon Group which has recently revealed its Cobra IV.

The first US anti-tank guided missile to be released was the Dart, or SSM-A-23, demonstrated in 1956 at the Aberdeen Proving Ground. In principle similar to the German X-7 and the latter's French derivatives, the Dart is, however, a much heavier and larger weapon having an overall length of 60 inches and a wing span of 50 inches. On the other hand, the first British missile of this type to be revealed in 1957, the Vickers-Armstrongs Type 891, has a wing span of only 11 inches and an overall length of 32 inches while its weight, with the carrying case-cum-launcher and optical sight, is between 35 and 40 pounds.

Other anti-tank guided missiles whose development has been revealed, include the Australian Malkara designed to a British Army specification, the Japanese Kawasaki and the French S.S.22 with radar guidance.

All the earlier missiles—the X-7, S.S.10 and 11, Entac, Cobra IV, Dart, and the Vickers 891—use optical track command guidance and a wire command link. The former

implies directing the missile along the operator's line-of-sight to the target; the latter, very thin single or twin wires which are paid out by the missile as it flies toward its target and through which the electrical signals controlling it are transmitted. Both the optical command system and the wire link have their limitations with respect to range. The former is affected by visibility while the latter is subject to interference from telephone cables, trees and other ground features. But they possess the great advantage of relative simplicity over other more sophisticated guided weapon systems, and are quite capable of highly accurate guidance of the missiles at normal battle ranges and under average combat conditions. For instance, during the 1956 French Army trials of the S.S.10, more than 80 per cent of hits were scored under representative operational conditions. In actual combat a lower percentage would in all probability be obtained but, nevertheless, the score is likely to be very high.

The high degree of accuracy made possible by controlling and adjusting the flight path of the missile and its combination with a large diameter shaped charge warhead are

the principal feature of the anti-tank guided missile. Hitherto the two have been largely incompatible; in the absence of guidance, a high degree of accuracy at range requires high velocity and this has proved neither desirable nor possible with most weapons with which the shaped charge has been used.

Thus, the use of the shaped charge has been confined largely to relatively short ranges and to short range weapons, such as the bazooka and similar anti-tank rocket launchers. As a further consequence of this state of affairs, high velocity guns up to 120mm calibre relying on the kinetic energy of their shot for armor piercing performance, have continued to be used for anti-tank work at medium and long ranges, in spite of their great disadvantage of relatively heavy weight.

The appearance of anti-tank guided missiles, however, has radically altered the situation. Because they can achieve very high accuracy at range, without the use of high velocity, they have made possible effective long-range shaped charge missiles. And, by the same token, they have made possible relatively light weight long-range anti-tank weapon systems capable of destroying the heaviest armor.

The major consequences of this are twofold. So far as unarmored troops are concerned, they now possess the means to engage the heaviest hostile tanks and the latter, in spite of their heavy armor, need no longer represent a deadly threat even to troops landed by helicopter who are obviously restricted as to the weight of equipment which they can carry with them.

So far as both friendly and hostile tanks are concerned, the appearance of anti-tank guided missiles demands considerable change in their form and mode of action. Contrary



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to some suggestions, the ability of the anti-tank guided missiles to penetrate the heaviest armor protection does not spell the end of tanks, any more than did numerous earlier anti-tank weapons. But it reduces further the relative advantage of this protection and calls for a different conceptual approach to tanks from that which has prevailed so far.

Until now, the approach to tanks has all too often concentrated on the passive and secondary attribute of armor protection and not often enough on their fundamental ability to act as a highly mobile source of direct fire power. Among other things, this overemphasis on armor protection has led to erroneous conclusions that the tank is finished every time some more effective armor piercing weapon was introduced. More careful analysis would have shown that tanks have never been invulnerable and that armor protection is not their only or even principal attribute. This, however, has only been brought home to many by the appearance of the anti-tank guided missiles, which show the futility of relying on the sheer weight of armor and point to the need to concentrate instead on the more important and enduring combination of fire power and mobility inherent in tanks.

The necessary change in emphasis should be all the easier since tanks will benefit from the development of surface-to-surface guided missiles as much as other military units. As they will no longer have to carry heavy high velocity guns and as heavy armor protection will become less important they will be able to shed much of their present weight without compromising their ability to deliver effective fire power—in the form of guided missiles against hostile armor and other crew-served weapons against other targets.

On the other hand, the reduced weight and increased overall mobility will make tanks much more useful and more frequently usable. In particular, they should be capable of more immediate and effective participation in amphibious operations, in contrast to the present day 50-ton medium tanks.

The trend toward increased employment of lighter weight tanks, made possible by the use of anti-



tank guided missiles, is likely to be reinforced further by the needs of the missiles themselves. To achieve maximum effect the latter need highly mobile launching platforms. The majority of the existing anti-tank guided missiles can be man-handled but there is little doubt that their overall effectiveness, as that of tactical missiles in general, can be greatly increased by suitable highly mobile launchers.

Some of the possibilities in this field have been demonstrated already by the display of Soviet tactical missiles mounted on tank-type chassis, including that of the new Soviet light amphibious reconnaissance tank, at the 7 November 1957, Moscow parade. Other possibilities are indicated by the Swiss Rexim V.P.90 tracked carrier, and its French Fouga counterpart, which provide a low-silhouette highly mobile platform for missiles of the S.S.10 type for a

total weight of only 3,000 pounds.

Either approach, therefore, be it from the direction of tanks or that of anti-tank guided missiles, points to the combination of the mobility of the tank with the fire power of the guided missile. With it goes a general reduction in the weight of armored vehicles, resulting from the elimination of the need for heavy high velocity guns and from the greatly reduced value of heavy thick armor. These, in turn, indicate greater mobility of the future combat vehicle, be it called a tank, tankette, weapon carrier or self-propelled launcher, and a much greater utilization potential. Thus, in the long run, anti-tank guided missiles are more likely to lead to increased employment of tank-type vehicles rather than their extinction. But it is equally likely that their shape and tactics will differ vastly from those of the tanks used hitherto. USMC



## LET US ASSOCIATE

5TH INF BN, USMCR, DETROIT, MICH. — "The purposes for which the Association is formed are to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science among the members, and to provide for their professional advancement; to foster the spirit and preserve the traditions of the United States Marine Corps; to increase the efficiency thereof, and to further the interests of the military and naval services in all ways not inconsistent with the good of the general government."

For 42 of the 45 years that the US Marine Corps Association has been in existence the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE has been the primary means of disseminating military knowledge among the members. The GAZETTE is an excellent and highly respected military journal, and is recognized as the professional magazine of the Marine Corps. However, it is not my purpose to extol its virtues. Rather, it is to re-examine the stated purpose of the Association, and recommend a course of action which will serve to dispel the apathy which has been a continuing concern of its president, board of governors and membership.

The GAZETTE, per se, does not fulfill the requirements of the intent and meaning of disseminate for it is limited to the printed word and illustrations. For this reason the Association has come to be identified only in terms of the GAZETTE, and the representatives in the field as subscription salesmen. An association must have other means for the dissemination of information if it is to grow and have professional character. The most commonly used

other means is the spoken word: informal conversation, seminar discussions and the oral presentation of professional papers.

There are officers and NCOs throughout the Marine Corps who, daily, solve some vexing problem or devise a new method of accomplishing an assignment which could contribute to the body of knowledge of our chosen profession. Unfortunately, these gems of initiative and imagination very seldom get beyond the immediate desk or shop of the originator. In order to provide a forum for the nurturing and exchange of these ideas it is proposed



that local chapters of the Marine Corps Association be formed. Initially, one chapter at each post, station and organized reserve unit should provide a base upon which to build. At chapter meetings monthly or quarterly the program would be built around the presentation of one or two professional papers, a guest speaker if available, and a discussion of topics of current military interest. The success of each chapter will depend on the enthusiasm and imagination of the membership in developing and maintaining a stim-

ulating program. After these chapters have been functioning for 6 months or more it is recommended that consideration be given to holding an annual, national meeting.

With the establishment of local chapters the Association would supplement the GAZETTE and fulfill its purpose of disseminating the knowledge of military art and science among the members, and providing for their professional advancement. In addition, the close association and stimulation afforded by the chapters would give body and soul to the remainder of the stated purpose "to foster the spirit and preserve the traditions of the United States Marine Corps; to increase the efficiency thereof; and to further the interests of the military and naval services in all ways not inconsistent with the good of the general government." As the chapters grow the Association will crystalize as a recognizable, desirable entity, and officers and non-commissioned officers will seek membership in order to increase their professional knowledge and be identified with the accomplishments of the Association.

Fellow members, let us associate!

LtCol F. H. Scantling

Ed: The Marine Corps Association is thoroughly in accord with LtCol Scantling's suggestion. Members of the Association are encouraged to form local chapters for the furtherance of the aims of the Association.

## RANK MISNOMERS

NROTC UNIT, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY. — With the promulgation of Marine Corps Bulletin 1223, 6 Oct 1958, we at last have an official proclamation regarding the new enlisted rank structure previously announced through unofficial media. We see the readoption of the ranks of Gunnery Sergeant and Master Gunnery Sergeant, which must delight the many old timers who could never understand why these ranks were discarded in the first place. At the same time, however, I suspect that many Marines, both old and young, are wondering exactly what T/O billets will be filled by these readopted ranks and how

★  
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they will be related to the occupational field/MOS structure currently in effect. The brief explanatory statements in the bulletin do little to clarify the matter. The only indications we are given are that "personnel to be promoted to Master Sergeant, E-8 will be outstandingly competent Marines, capable of supervising all MOS's within an Occupational Field" and that "This will be a program separate from the First Sergeant/Sergeant Major program."

It appears, then, that the First Sergeant/Sergeant Major program will remain the same. The NCO who is brought up in a combat/combat support field and who is then sent through a personnel administration school will be in line, successively, for the ranks of First Sergeant and Sergeant Major, as will the administrator who performs sometime during his career in a combat/combat support field. The remainder, regardless of occupational field, will be Master Sergeants and Master Gunnery Sergeants after passing first through the grade of Gunnery Sergeant.

This new structure appears to create far more problems than it will eliminate. Let's take it from grade E-7, Gunnery Sergeant. The name of the rank should have some significance from either the traditional or the functional point of view, but under the new structure it falls short of both these criteria. Is the E-7 DPI accountant a *Gunnery Sergeant*? The title *Gunnery Sergeant* implies a connection with a combat field, a connection that might be stretched to include a combat support field, but it has nothing whatsoever to do with the purely technical fields which, to be sure, are necessary today. Traditionally, the title belongs to the second senior man in a combat unit of the company level, and the job that goes with it is most demanding. It requires a high degree of professional competence and personal leadership, and it is attained only after many years' experience in the field. Naturally, the DPI accountant has considerable experience in his field too and he is just as essential to the overall mission of the Corps. No one will deny that he is a highly-trained intelligent individual, but he is not a *Gunnery*

*Sergeant* in any sense of the term and he should not be referred to as such.

What, then, should we call our technical man in the DPI field (or the utilities, electronics maintenance fields, etc.)? I would say that the term *Technical Sergeant* pretty well describes him. He is a staff NCO and he is in a technical field. What rank title could be more appropriate?

Now let's look at the situation on the E-8 level. In any FMF company the senior NCO is the First Sergeant. As such he should be the most experienced and competent man in the company from the standpoint of that company's function. In a rifle company, he should be an NCO experienced primarily in the infantry field. In a motor transport company he should be, by training and experience, a motor transport man, and so on. If he has had either administrative schooling or experience along the way, so much the better, but it should not be considered essential to the rank or job of First Sergeant. To expect a First Sergeant to have the administrative qualifications of an 0141 in addition to out-

standing professional competence in his own field is out of the question. The solution is to promote the "outstandingly competent" E-7s in the combat/combat support fields to the grade of First Sergeant and have them fill the First Sergeant billets. As for the E-7s in the purely technical fields, they should become Master Sergeants upon promotion to grade E-8. A more fitting title might be Master Technical Sergeant, but this I have reserved for grade E-9.

The final step in the promotional ladder under the recently announced structure presents problems similar to those created on the lower levels. It appears that the NCO who has reached the top in a combat/combat support field, but who has not had an opportunity to become proficient in administration, will become a Master Gunnery Sergeant. At the same time, the technical NCO who reaches the top in his field will also become a Master Gunnery Sergeant. Under these circumstances the rank title will be virtually meaningless. It will indicate a pay grade and very little more. It will lump all E-9s of all fields who

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have not had administrative experience into one large group apart from (and, inevitably, lower than) their Sergeant Major brothers. The differentiation will, in fact, begin on the E-8 level under the current First Sergeant/Sergeant Major program, and the ultimate result will be that First Sergeants and Sergeants Major will be NCOs with administrative backgrounds who will follow a natural tendency to make their billets primarily administrative. This, of course, is not the intent of that program, but it is true. Tell a company commander he is getting a designated First Sergeant and he immediately believes his office troubles are over. The *Gunny* can run things in the field, and the *First Sergeant* can play chief clerk in the company office. No, this definitely is not the intent of the First Sergeant/Sergeant Major program, but isn't it the way the program is turning out?

Going further with the E-9 problem, the term Master Gunnery Sergeant, which evokes identification with the combat/combat support fields, will have no real connection with those fields. We could just as well use the term Master Marine Sergeant or Master Master Sergeant to identify this group of E-9s of all occupational fields.

The whole situation, I feel, will become most undesirable. It could, however, be circumvented in this way: retain the term Sergeant Major as a billet designator only; promote, after stringent selection, those E-8s of the combat/combat support fields to the rank of Master Gunnery Sergeant; and fill Sergeant Major billets with Master Gunnery Sergeants. Then, to give the NCO in the purely technical field a rank title with meaning, promote highly qualified Master Sergeants to Master Technical Sergeant and have them fill the top billets in organizations that are primarily technical in nature. In some cases the billet would be that of Sergeant Major.

The senior NCO structure indicated above would serve 3 purposes. First, it would preserve the ranks long associated with leadership in the combat/combat support fields. Secondly, the rank names would "sound" right: a Technical Sergeant would in fact be a Technical Ser-

geant, and a First Sergeant would hold the qualifications that go with being the First Sergeant on a company level. Thirdly, it should simplify T/O billet transition which, it appears, will be a rather sticky job under the newly announced structure. And, if you want, you may go a step further. Retain Staff Sergeant at E-6 and bring back the Platoon Sergeant rank title. The technical field sequence would then be Staff, Technical, Master and Master Technical Sergeant while the combat/combat support sequence would run



from Platoon Sergeant through Gunnery and First Sergeant to Master Gunnery Sergeant.

Surely there are arguments against such a structure. One might be that it would create too great a cleavage between our technical and combat/combat support fields, would split our senior NCOs into camps and cause disunity. Basically this is nonsense. Every thinking Marine knows that modern warfare calls for some degree of specialization and that the radar repairman is just as important as the artillery man. Neither should belittle the other or be ashamed of his own specialty. Nevertheless, the placing of a diamond or a bursting bomb in one man's chevron and nothing (or even worse, a "T") in another's would tend to disturb a number of people. Witness the

Army's chevron fiasco of not so long ago. Surely there is a solution to this possibly serious problem. One might be to place the crossed rifles of the recently announced structure in the technical field chevrons. After all, these NCOs are no less Marines than their brothers in the combat/combat support fields. Crossed rifles would be a constant reminder to all hands that Marines, regardless of specialty, are ready and able to assume combat functions.

Another problem might arise. The company First Sergeant has, for the past few years at least, run the company office. This has required that he have considerable administrative experience, since his clerks are usually young and relatively untrained. What, then, will happen if Gunnery Sergeants are promoted to First Sergeant solely on the basis of their demonstrated competence in a combat/combat support field? The quality of company administration might possibly fall to an unacceptable level unless the company commander were to spend a disproportionate amount of time on that facet of his responsibilities. There are 2 solutions to this problem. One would be to return to battalion administration throughout the Corps, but I feel this is undesirable for several reasons which need not be gone into here. The other is that either an E-6 or E-7 in the 0100 field be included in the company T/O as chief clerk. This NCO would assume the administrative burden in the company office, thereby allowing the First Sergeant to perform truly the duties of a First Sergeant both in the field and in garrison.

I suspect that there are other "bugs" in the structure I have proposed. Possibly such a structure was considered by the groups of officers and NCOs referred to in Marine Corps Bulletin 1223 and was rejected for reasons that have not occurred to me. Be that as it may, the new structure does have defects and will someday be revised. Perhaps other Marines will pick out the best points of the new structure and of suggested substitutes, which will surely be presented from time to time, so that when the next revision does come it will be a step closer to a perfect solution.

Maj T. H. Galbraith

Marine Corps Gazette • January 1959

## SMALL UNIT TRAINING

● NAS, OLATHE, KANS.—Today the United States Marine Corps infantryman is considered by uninformed "arm chair tacticians" to be, for the most part, an obsolete part of modern warfare. Conversely, modern strategists share the opinion that with the adoption of missiles, atomic weapons and new landing techniques the infantryman, and especially the junior NCO, must be even more efficient, self-reliant and highly responsible.

Finding a solution to keeping an effective peacetime training program rolling in our present infantry companies of the FMF is indeed one of much concern to many. Problems confronting the average company commander are too numerous to mention, each having its effect on the unit concerned.

The training syllabus of the line company is normally scheduled around the needs of the company commander. However, here at this point is where I feel a definite change could come about, not so much in the scheduling itself but in the way in which it is carried out.

In a good portion of our infantry units, sometime during the year's training cycle, our junior NCO, instead of being such, often ends up as another rifleman. This cannot and should not be allowed to happen in our infantry if we are to succeed in future missions, regardless of the demands.

In finding the solution to the problem, I refer the reader to the "Marine Rifle Squad" (NAVMC 1046 DPP) which defines the duties of the fire team leader. In part it states that the fire team leader is responsible to the squad leader for the training, discipline and conduct of the fire team. Does the squad leader supervise the training of his fire teams, or of his fire team leaders? I fear that in most cases the fire team leader passes through this phase of training as nothing more than another rifleman. Here, I feel a great mistake is made. Why can't the fire team leader be schooled in his job as a small unit leader and then conduct and control the training of his men under the supervision of the squad leader, pla-

toon guide or a platoon sergeant? What should be kept in mind is that the fire team leader is one who should train his men and be responsible to his squad leader for such training.

While we are on the subject on training, let us move on to the squad. Does the platoon leader supervise squad training, or does he supervise squad leaders while they train their men? If training is considered a progressive and continuous thing, then the platoon leader should utilize squad leaders in extensive schooling in tactics of their squads while the fire teams are conducting their training. Pointing out mistakes being made by fire team leaders and giving corrective action, the platoon leader provides the squad leader the opportunity to learn from his fire team leader as well as his seniors. In this way the squad leader can see the picture develop as his 3 fire teams combine into a working unit.

I have in all probability, made this sound too simple. But to incorporate such a plan will take the use of each NCO of the platoon and company. Further, it will require more planning and extra work for everyone concerned. However, the end results can be great and at the end of the training cycle the true efforts far exceed those of past periods.

The current NCO schools are good, but they can only do so much. The unit to which the NCO is a part, must use him as such or he will not be worth the time it took to school or promote him.

Practical application, allowing the fire team leader to exercise command prerogatives over his fire team and continue it through the squads and platoon during the phase or cycle of training will develop the junior NCO's confidence, stimulate his interest and thereby bring forth a well trained platoon.

TSgt D. D. Donahue

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# PASSING IN REVIEW

## BAND OF BROTHERS

ERNEST FRANKEL. 360 pages. The Macmillan Company, N.Y. \$4.50

Reading this novel with a "frozen Chosin" background is more than a diversion; it is an experience. It is an adventure into the pages of the finest novel to come out of the Korean War—a novel that can stand comparison with the classics of American war literature.

All men of normal instincts find it necessary to conquer their fear of death in the form of shrieking fragments of jagged steel coming from



the unseen enemy's side of the MLR. It is also necessary at times for a man to conquer his doubts of himself, and that can be the harder struggle of the two.

*Band of Brothers* is primarily the story of Bill Patrick, a Marine company commander, as he learns in action the difference between command and leadership. The Marine Corps has authorized him to wear 2 silver bars denoting his fitness to guide and direct men in mortal combat. But Capt Patrick has his own private doubts—at least, he hopes they are private. The men also have their doubts, for troops in battle can be uncannily quick to spot an officer's waverings and hesitations.

As an added complication, Capt Patrick has a competent and experienced Exec who has forgotten more about the practical side of war than he himself has ever learned. Lt Anderson never fails to assert himself, with ill concealed contempt for a reservist, recently snatched from civilian life, who has yet to hear the traditional shot fired in anger. Patrick, an architect by profession, realizes that it is a question whether he or Joe Anderson will have the actual command of Able Company.

He realizes further that while it

isn't strictly necessary for an officer to be liked, he must be respected. Bill Patrick suspects, the first time he visits an outpost under fire, that veteran NCOs are finding him too ready to hit the deck. Reacting with angry pride, he deliberately stands up and drinks from his canteen with his back to the enemy, all the time expecting the shock of a sniper's bullet. It is then he learns, from the attitude of his men, that troops have small respect for the officer who takes needless risks in a spirit of bravado.

The story of the struggle waged on the battlefield of Bill Patrick's emotions, as he makes himself a commander both liked and respected by

Able Company, is told with suspense, with humor, with compassion—and, above all, with understanding. Maj Frankel, a reserve officer had his own experience of war as a platoon commander on Okinawa. Born in 1923, he has been a resident of North Carolina most of his life and is a graduate of the state university. He now lives in Hendersonville with his wife and 2 children and "commutes" to New York for theatrical work.

Another Marine reserve officer, Lt Roger T. Ferriter, who will be remembered for some top-drawer MARINE CORPS GAZETTE covers, is the artist who turned out the striking jacket illustration for Maj Frankel's book. Depicting weary Marines fighting their way from the Reservoir to the sea, it has been reproduced by several publications which reviewed the novel.

As further evidence that this is a book by Marines for Marines, Leon Uris is an enthusiastic advocate. Author of *Battle Cry*, the best novel to come out of WWII, he has waged a personal campaign to tell editors and reviewers that they shouldn't miss *Band of Brothers*.

Veterans of the Reservoir may find it a weakness that the novel takes liberties now and then with the historical facts. The Chinese Reds, for instance, didn't field a single tank in the Reservoir campaign. But this reviewer would rather believe they did than to miss the superb account of a fight to the death between a CCF tank without infantry support and Marine infantry without armored support.

History, however well it may be written, has its limitations. History can record the facts but it takes a novel to get deep down inside a man, as witness this X-Ray picture of Bill Patrick on the fighting "advance" to the rear":

"A plume of breath followed him as he swayed drunkenly down the road. . . . The cold was a knife that stabbed at the ganglia, sending piercing impulses through him until he shook in a convulsion of trembling. Sweat poured from his dry and frozen body, scalding his eyes, obscuring the totality of misery around him. His mind, disembodied, was a turning prism with a different sharp color on every side. He fought

delirium, not by holding on to reality, but by pushing it aside. He could escape only by exploring the vaults of his memory."

Bill Patrick isn't the only character in the book, of course. There are also such memorable figures as Sanchez, from the New York slums; Firsteen, the Jewish BARman; and Huckabee, the heroic colored corpsman. And there is nobody more appealing than terrified Woody Dorn, the Army private who regains his fighting spirit after surviving a massacre and attaching himself to Able Company.

Marine conversation in these pages would have to be censored for a church supper, but it is restrained as compared to the dialogue of most war novels. *Band of Brothers* is not one of the books that the late H. L. Mencken described as "boob-shockers."

The meaning of the title will be clear to Marine readers by the time they turn the last page. It refers to that comradeship without a parallel in civilian life; that selfless and devoted comradeship of men who have fought shoulder to shoulder. Every war is waged by a comparatively few dedicated men, and this is the saga of the band of brothers who slugged it out with the communists while most of their countrymen were enjoying the boons of peace and prosperity.

Reviewed by Lynn Montross

Ed: A frequent contributor to the *Gazette*, the reviewer is a historian with the Historical Branch, G3, HQMC.

## THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD MARSHAL MONTGOMERY

Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K. G. 508 pages, illustrated. The World Publishing Company, Cleveland and New York. \$6.00

Field Marshal Montgomery has already written two books; this is the third. His first two, "Alamein to the River Sangro" and "Normandy to the Baltic" were hard, bare military accounts of the WW II operations in these areas. They were primarily books for military study. These Memoirs are different. They contain a personal account of his own lifetime and the main highlights of his 50 years of commissioned service in the British Army.

His boyhood and early life in the

Army are dealt with very briefly as is his service during WWI when he rose to the rank of LtCol. It appears to be a requisite of success in later life that one's career at a very early stage should nearly end in disaster. In Montgomery's case he was very nearly expelled from the Military Academy at Sandhurst for fighting, and in WWI he was badly wounded and a grave was actually dug for his body.

Most of this book is concerned with his activities during WWII, at the outbreak of which he was given command of a division which formed part of the British Expeditionary Force in France, and which eventually withdrew over the beaches at Dunkirk. For the next 2 years he was concerned as a Corps Commander with the defense of the United Kingdom against invasion and the building up of the Army in England.



Then in August 1942 the Field Marshal was given command of the 8th Army in Egypt and in 3 months his name was a household word—in England anyway.

In his treatment of his WWII memories Montgomery does not try to write another history. He deals with the main arguments and decisions that were made before and during battles and campaigns. In describing the battle of ALAM HALFA for instance he writes mainly about how he watched his subordinates at work so that he could get the right commanders in the right job. The major point dealt with for the invasion of Sicily, is the alteration of

the plan for landing, an alteration which was eventually agreed between Bedell Smith and Montgomery in an Algerian lavatory.

The Field Marshal deals in detail with all the controversial points of the campaign in North West Europe: the battle of the breakout in Normandy; the Allies' strategy north of the Seine; and perhaps the most controversial of them all, whether there should have been a single Land Forces commander interposed between Gen Eisenhower and his Army Group Commanders.

The last 10 chapters deal with his post war activities. He remained in Germany as Commander of the British Zone until he became Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1946. Two years later he became Chairman of the Western Union Defense Organization which before long blossomed into NATO, when he became Deputy Supreme Commander first to Gen Eisenhower and then to Gens Ridgway, Gruenther and Norstad in succession. It is from this position that he discusses the defense of the western nations based on nuclear weapons, and the future of NATO as a whole, discussions which have already provoked considerable argument.

"Monty" is probably one of the most controversial international characters in the world today, largely because he has always been extremely critical and outspokenly frank in all he does. As he says in his book—"People may misunderstand what I am doing but I am willing to bet that they do not misunderstand what I am saying. At least they know quite well what they are disagreeing with." That quotation by itself gives a very adequate insight into his book.

These Memoirs do give a most clear account of many of the most important happenings in the last 20 years. But he gives plenty of cause for argument however, even though there is something new in his account that we do not usually associate with him, an admission in several instances that perhaps he might be wrong.

Two chapters of this book in particular will be welcome to the military student. "My doctrine of command" and "Some thought on High Command in war" give his views on

leadership. Coming from a man whom even his biggest detractors must admit was a wonderful leader of men, these views are extremely valuable.

*The Memoirs Of Field Marshal Montgomery* is a book that takes an unchallenged place alongside the writing of the other WWII Commanders. It gives a fascinating story of a fascinating man.

Reviewed by LtCol F. C. Barton, RM

Ed: Presently Commanding Officer of 45 Commando, Royal Marines, the reviewer was Royal Marine Liaison Officer at MCS, Quantico, Va., 1956-1958.

## THE DECISION TO INTERVENE

GEORGE F. KENNAN. 513 pages, illustrated. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. \$7.50

In *The Decision to Intervene*, second in a 3-volume history of Soviet-American relations, Mr. Kennan studies the misadventures, misinformation, and misadvice that brought the United States to a misbegotten intervention into Russian affairs in 1918.

While telling what might otherwise be a dull story, the author by sheer, determined objectivity and scholarly brilliance brings the beginnings of Bolshevism to life in an enthralling manner. He carefully constructs a foundation of historic fact and then builds up — pyramid fashion — to the peak: the decision to intervene.

The book, amply illustrated with maps and photographs, is "intended to hold meaning for the general public as well as for the specialist." At the same time there are rich bonuses for the military reader, and it automatically takes a place high on the reading list of officers assigned to military assistance groups or attache duty. The role of the many officers from various nations in Russia on such assignments in 1918 and earlier had tremendous influence on the actions of their governments. American decision and action was often strongly influenced, if not sometimes dictated, by the action of thousands of "American officers, both military and civilian, who, over the course of our history, under the stresses of war and in the face of inadequate or senseless instructions, have taken it upon themselves to act on their own best judgment."

This work is also a study in military/political relations and points

up the folly of consistently exaggerating the separation of the two in prosecuting national policy. When MajGen William S. Graves was suddenly selected to command the AEF to Siberia he was handed the following order by the Secretary of War:

"This contains the policy of the United States in Russia which you are to follow. Watch your step; you will be walking on eggs loaded with dynamite. God bless you and goodbye."

The policy referred to was a copy of an aide-memoire prepared by President Wilson. This was substantially the only guidance Gen Graves received for his complicated mission. He followed it stubbornly for a year and a half although it was at the time presented to him "utterly inadequate to its purpose, . . . still further out of date by the time he arrived in Siberia, and . . . within 2 months after his arrival it had lost all conceivable relevance. . . ."

Although best taken in short draughts, *The Decision to Intervene* is a valuable and pleasant treatment of a vital historic drama which leaps to life as if it were being acted out on today's international stage.

Reviewed by LtCol D. D. Nicholson, Jr.

Ed: This reviewer was assigned to the Division of Information HQMC, and is now retired.

## RECOLLECTIONS OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF OFFICER

G. MOXLEY SORREL. Edited by BELL IRVIN WILEY. 322 pages, illustrated. McCowat-Mercer Press, Inc., Jackson, Tenn. \$5.00

Bell Irvin Wiley, editor of the McCowat-Mercer Press, has been engaged for some time in reviving and reprinting primary source material of the Civil War. *Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer* is certainly worthy of being revived. The recollections are those of G. Moxley Sorrel, Chief of Staff to LtGen James Longstreet — "Lee's War Horse." Sorrel served under Longstreet from the Battle of First Bull Run in July, 1861, until he left him at Petersburg, Va., in October, 1864, to take command of a brigade. His story is essentially the story of Longstreet's command, the I Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. It is well written, moves smoothly, and is remarkably free of prejudice and bias. Full of anecdotes and sketches of the South's top military leaders, Sorrel's account does not gloss over the shortcomings

or attempt to minimize the achievements of those he describes. Apparently written during a last long illness and partial convalescence from 1899 to 1901, it was not published until 1905, a few years after his death. A second edition was published in 1917.

The editor of this third edition has made corrections in the interest of readability. He has not, however, altered the original meaning in any sense. Where necessary to correct Sorrel's very few errors of fact or to add explanatory material, he has added footnotes. The number of these footnotes is mercifully few and all are short. In addition, Mr. Wiley has supplied an illustration section, an appendix containing Sorrel's obituary, an index, and finally, his own introduction which, as always, provides a fine review and summary of the book and of the author.

Reviewed by LtCol C. T. Earnest, USA

Ed: This reviewer is CONARC liaison officer at the Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center, MCS, Quantico and an avid student of the Civil War.

(Continued on page 64)

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(Continued from page 62)

## THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY

GERHARD VON GLAHN. 350 pages. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. \$6.50

Gerhard Von Glahn examines the generally accepted principles and practices pertaining to the military occupation of enemy territory prior to the conclusion of peace. He outlines the weaknesses of the existing rules and discusses proposals designed to improve the administration of occupied enemy territory.

He delves into the tangle of problems that confront both the occupant and the occupied. These include the questions of sovereignty and allegiance, the status of courts, taxes and debts, public and private property, business, guerrilla forces, military government, and the laws of war.

Despite its concern with technical and legal points, *Occupation of Enemy Territory* reads at a fast pace. This is largely due to the logical and organized manner in which the author treats each issue. Although the

problems are complex, he does not scrutinize or turn them until the military reader becomes lost in law or details.

In addition to providing a clear analysis of the law and practice of belligerent occupation, this volume points to most of the significant literature on the subject by means of extensive footnotes and a 28 page bibliography.

One can hardly doubt the relevance of such a book in a century of wars and occupations. Yet the reader may feel that much of the author's concern over the background and use of the existing rules is unreal in the face of Soviet philosophy.

Professor von Glahn is head of the political science department at the University of Minnesota, Duluth Branch. During WWII as a US Army officer, he did research on military occupation problems.

Reviewed by Capt T. E. Donnelly

Ed: This reviewer is attached to the I&I staff of the 96th Reserve Infantry Company, Pueblo, Colo.

## STRATEGIC SURRENDER

PAUL KECSKEMETI. Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, Calif. \$5.00

This is the book which caused the recent, widely reported furor in the national capital. I am certain that the author is amazed (and the publisher delighted) over the tempest it has created. The notoriety given what otherwise would have been a little read study, may in the end, serve a good purpose. If enough people now read the book, this country may establish a national, rather than emotional surrender policy with respect to future enemies. Far from being a blueprint of how the US should surrender to the USSR in some future thermonuclear war, the study "deals with strategic surrender as a problem in political theory"—as the author says in the opening sentence of the book.

Dr. Kecskemeti first explores the problems of surrender as a strategic concept and as a political concept. In the light of the conclusions he arrives at in these chapters he goes on to examine 4 case histories of strategic surrender in WWII; those of France, Italy, Germany and Japan. He concludes his study with chapters on surrender in the future in an age of nuclear warfare.

The problem of strategic surrender in modern warfare is obviously complex and crucial; for the victor, the vanquished and the peace of the whole world. That we and our Allies have not fared too well in our surrender policies in 2 world wars has become painfully apparent to most people. In the 4 case histories examined, the results of our inflexible unconditional surrender policy is examined in context with other alternatives open to us had our policy allowed greater freedom of action in receiving the surrender of the defeated nations.

This could have been a monotonously dull book, but Dr. Kecskemeti has made it most readable, while retaining a high order of scholarship and critical thought. The surrender case histories are extremely interesting reading for anyone whose major concern in WWII was in winning the next day's battle.

Reviewed by Col F. P. Henderson

Ed: A frequent contributor to the *Gazette*, this reviewer is assigned to the Pentagon.

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MB, Sasebo  
WO G. J. Decaro

MB, Yokosuka  
Maj S. J. Kramek

Camp Smedley D. Butler  
Col J. S. Skoczylas

ROK Marine Corps  
Col E. H. Forney

1st MCRRD  
Capt C. J. Gilroy

4th MCRRD  
Lt Col A. A. Poindexter

5th MCRRD  
Capt R. E. Haebel

6th MCRRD  
Lt Col J. W. Stevens, II

8th MCRRD  
1st Lt J. E. Kussmann

9th MCRRD  
Lt Col W. E. Lunn

10th MCRRD  
Col G. R. Long

12th MCRRD  
Lt Col A. D. Cereghino

14th MCRRD  
Capt T. S. Brown

12th Inf Bn  
Maj A. G. Copp

5th 105mm How Btry  
Capt G. M. Livingston

16th Rifle Co  
Capt C. P. Peters

5th Inf Co  
Maj B. T. Leonard

27th Inf Co  
1st Lt M. L. Woodward

34th Inf Co.  
CWO W. C. Seitz

39th Inf Co  
Capt T. C. Budd, II

62d Inf Co  
1st Lt H. E. Sheeley

63d Inf Co  
Capt V. McGloan

68th Inf Co  
Capt B. H. Murray

69th Inf Co  
1st Lt A. T. Gamon

71st Inf Co  
Capt H. E. Hoskins

72d Inf Co  
Capt F. M. McCurdy



74th Inf Co  
Capt M. E. Garber

75th Inf Co  
Capt W. D. Schaler

76th Inf Co  
Capt J. R. Dopler

77th Inf Co  
1st Lt J. E. Kosanke

78th Inf Co  
Capt E. W. Elder



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